Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1986

Dalvin J. Williams v. James N. Barber, Martin
Verhoef, David E. Yocom, Barber, Verhoff, and
Yocom : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Eric Taylor; J. Bruce Alverson; Attorneys for Appellant.
James N. Barber; Barber, Verhoef and Yocom; Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Williams v. Barber, No. 198620983.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1483

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
UTAH

,,

D0cu:»i:/r|
KFU
)\>CKETuO|U

•-uiaiunaji'MLM mil 'ir - a a a — —

61

IN THE SUPREME COURT

7

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

8
9

*****

DALVIN J. WILLIAMS,
CASE NO. : 20893

10

Appellant,

11
vs.

12
13
14
15

JAMES N. BARBER, MARTIN VERHOEF,
and DAVID E. YOCOM, partners in
the law firm of BARBER, VERHOEF
& YOCOM,
Respondents.

16
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

17
18
Eric Taylor, Esquire

19 J. BRUCE ALVERSON, LTD.
600 S. Eighth Street
89101
Attorney for Appellant

20 Las Vegas, Nevada
21

James N. Barber, Esquire
BARBER, VERHOEF & YOCOM
255 East 400 South, #100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Respondent.

22
23
24
25
26
27

FILED
JAN 151986

28
utao

V

* * *} <

*P»

>*'-* ^ I H <

it

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
. ,: c

b - :->. i

!TAH

8
9
DALVIN J. WILLIAMS,
CASE NO.

10

20893

Appellant,

11
vs.

12
13
14
15

JAMES N. BARBER, MARTIN VERHOEF,
and DAVID E. YOCOM, partners in
the law firm of BARBER, VERHOEF
& YOCOM,
Respondents.

16
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

18
Eric Taylor, Esquire

19 J. BRUCE ALVERSON, LTD.
600 S. Eighth Street
89101
Attorney for Appellant

20 Las Vegas, Nevada
21
22
23
24
25
26

James N. Barber, Esquire
BARBER, VERHOEF & YOCOM
255 East 400 South, #100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Respondent.

1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

2
3

Page

4

Table of Contents

2

5

Table of Authorities

3

6

Statement of Issues Presented on Appeal

4

7

Statement of the Case

5

8

Statement of Facts

6

9

Summary of Argument

9

10 Argument
11 Conclusion
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

28

Addendum

10
18
19

1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Cases:

Page

Bartholomew v. Crockett, 475 N.E. 2d 1035
(Ill.App.lst Dist., 1985)

10, 11

Byrd v. Martin, Hopkins, Lemon & Carter, P.C.,
564 F.Supp. 1425 (WD Va., 1983)

12

Dings v. Callahan, 602 P.2d 542 (Kan., 1979)

11

Garguilo v. Schunk, 395 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1977)

12

Glidden v. Terranova, 427 N.E.2d 1169
(Mass., 1981)

11

Mendoza v. Schlossman, 448 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1982)

16

Young v. Bridwell, 437 P.2d 686,
20 Utah 2d 332 (1968)

11

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Rules;

16
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 34

17

17
Treatises:

18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25
26
27
28
LAW OFFICES

BRUCE ALVERSON LTD

Meiselman, Attorney Malpractice:
Law and Procedure (1980)

10, 11

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

2
3

I.
WHETHER A FINDING OF "MERITORIOUS CLAIM"
I S AN ELEMENT OF L I A B I L I T Y IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS

4

II.

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

28
L A W OFFICES

WHETHER THE OCTOBER 1 1 , 1 9 8 3 ORDER GRANTING
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO "ALL ISSUES RELATING TO
, . L I A B I L I T Y " DISPOSED OF THE "MERITORIOUS CLAIM" ELEMENT
IN THE INSTANT CASE
III.
WHETHER THE TWENTY SEVEN THOUSAND DOLLAR ( $ 2 7 , 0 0 0 )
DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST WILLIAMS
AS A RESULT OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF BARBER
SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN THE DAMAGES
AWARDED TO WILLIAMS

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2
3
4
5
6

This appeal is from the August 12, 1985, final judgment
entered by Judge Frederick of the Third Judicial District Court
In

And

For

Frederick

Salt

failed

Lake
to

County,

include

State

a

twenty

Of

Utah,

seven

wherein

Judge

thousand

dollar

($27,000) default amount in the damages awarded to Plaintiff/-

7
Appellant,

DALVIN

J.

WILLIAMS

(hereinafter

referred

to

as

8
WILLIAMS), in the legal malpractice action against Defendant/-

9
Respondent, JAMES N. BARBER (hereinafter referred to as BARBER).

10
Judge Frederick excluded this default amount on the basis that no

11

evidence of "meritorious claim" was presented at the trial held

12
to determine the amount of damages to be awarded after liability

13
had

already

been

established

by

the

October

11,

1983

Order

14
granting partial summary judgment against BARBER as to any and

15
all

issued

relating

to

liability.

A

finding

of

"meritorious

16
claim" is an element of liability in legal malpractice actions

17
and the Order granting partial summary judgment as to liability

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
LAW OFFICES
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disposed of this element in the instant case.

Therefore, the

twenty

amount

seven thousand

dollar

($27,000) default

entered

against WILLIAMS as a result of the negligence of BARBER should
have been included in the damages awarded to WILLIAMS.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about December 15, 1980, WILLIAMS was served with
a Summons and Complaint in civil action number C-80-8309 filed in
the Third Judicial District Court In And For Salt Lake County,
State Of Utah, brought by C. Grant Morrison and Bonny Bruce to
recover the principal sum of twelve thousand dollars
for an alleged breach of contract.

($12,000)

(See page 98 of the record.)

On or about January 2, 1981, and pursuant to correspondence dated December 29, 1980, BARBER was retained as WILLIAMS'
attorney to file an Ansv/er in civil action number C-80-8309 and
to otherwise represent WILLIAMS in that matter. (See pages 49, 50
and 98 of the record.)
BARBER accepted

the retainer of five hundred dollars

($500.00) and agreed to defend WILLIAMS
8309.

in civil action C-80-

In so doing, BARBER had a duty to interpose an Answer and

to otherwise represent WILLIAMS in civil action C-80-8309.

(See

pages 98 and ""99 of the record.)
BARBER negligently failed to interpose a timely Answer
on WILLIAMS' behalf
thereof, a default

in civil action C-80-8309
judgment

amounting

to

and, by

reason

approximately

twenty

seven thousand dollars ($27,000) was entered against WILLIAMS on
or about March 16, 1981.

(See pages 99 and 100 of the record.)

Following the entry of said default judgment against WILLIAMS,
WILLIAMS

suffered

levies upon his

salary, loss of employment,

loss of his home, bankruptcy, and incurred substantial expenses
in attempting, in vain, to have said default judgment vacated a
set aside.

(See pages 100 through 102 of the record.)

1

Inasmuch as a valid defense could have been entered on

2

WILLIAMS' behalf in civil action C-80-8309 and due to BARBER'S

3

failure to file a timely answer or otherwise assert any defense

4
5 |
6
7
8

in WILLIAMS' behalf, the twenty seven thousand dollar

($27,000)

default judgment would not have been entered against WILLIAMS but
for the negligence of BARBER.
record.)

Hence, the

amount

(See pages 38, 99 and 100 of the
of

the

default

judgment

and

the

expenses incurred in attempting to set aside the default judgment

9
were proximately caused by the negligence of BARBER.

10
On or about August 10, 1983, WILLIAMS filed a Motion

11
For Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of liability in this

12
matter.

(See pages 25 through 56 of the record.)

Attached to

13
that Motion For Partial Summary Judgment was a copy of the Martin

14
Becker

deposition

transcript.

At

page

6

of

the

deposition

15
transcript (page 38 of the record) attorney Martin Becker asserts

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

that the underlying case (civil action C-80-8309) was defensible.
In a
Becker

letter* of December
explained

to

29, 1980 to BARBER, attorney

BARBER

that

the

lawsuit

brought

Martin
against

WILLIAMS was defensible

and, at a minimum, subject to various

set-offs.

was

This

letter

also

attached

in

its

entirety

to

WILLIAMS' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of
liability and appears at pages 4 9 and 5 0 of the record.
On or about October 11, 1983, Judge Frederick granted

25 summary judgment in favor of WILLIAMS on the issue of liability
26 and signed an Order to that effect.
27 the record.)

(See pages 57 thorough 59 of

Therefore, this matter proceeded to trial solely to

28 ascertain the amount of damages to be awarded to WILLIAMS.
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1]

On or about May 14, 1985, trial on the issue of the

2 I amount of damages to be awarded was held and final judgment was
i

3 |j entered on or about August 12, 1985.
4

A transcript of the trial

appears at pages 112 through 252 of the record while said final

5 jj judgment appears at pages 105 and 106 of the record. While the
6
final judgment awarded expenses incurred in attempting to have
7
the default judgment vacated and set aside, it failed to award
8
damages for the twenty seven thousand dollar ($27,000) default
9
judgment suffered by WILLIAMS as a result of the negligence of
10
BARBER. Therefore, this appeal is from the August 12, 1985
11
judgment as to damages.
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

2

A

finding

of

"meritorious

claim"

is

an

element

of

3

liability in legal malpractice actions.

4

appears to have placed the burden of proof on this element upon

While Utah, in the past,

5 ji the Plaintiff, the emerging contemporary approach now shifts the
6
7
8
9
10

burden of proof to the defendant attorney
"meritorious claim".

as t i i h<

issue of

In any event, however, the issue of "mer-

itorious claim" is an element of liability in legal malpractice
actions and any judgment as i o liability resolves the issue of
"meritorious claim".

11
The October

11, 1983 Order

granting

partial

summary

12
judgment as to "all issues relating

to

.

liability" thus

13
disposed of the "meritorious claim" element in the instant case.

14
Furthermore, evidence that civil action C-80-8309 was defensible

15
and

that

various

set

offs

existed

in

favor

of WILLIAMS

was

16
contained

in the deposition of attorney Martin Becker and at-

17
tached tn WILLIAMS' Motion For Summary Judgment.

Therefore, but

18
19
20
21
22
23
24

for the negligence

of BARBER, WILLIAMS would

twenty seven thousand dollar

not

have

had

a

($27,000) default iudgment entered

against him and, hence, said judgment was proximately caused by
the negligence of BARBER.
Inasmuch as the element of "meritorious claim" is an
element of liability which was resolved in \ ivor of WILLIAMS, the

25 twenty seven thousand dollar ($27,000) default judgment entered
26 against WILLIAMS as a result of the negligence of BARBER should
27 have been included in the damages awarded to WILLIAMS.
28
LAW OFf.CES
BRUCE ALVERSON LTD

li

1

ARGUMENT

2

I.

3

A FINDING OF "MERITORIOUS CLAIM" IS AN ELEMENT
OF LIABILITY IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS

4
5

el!

The elements of liability in legal malpractice actions
are as follows:

7

1.

8

rise to a duty;

9

2.

10
3.

12

That the attorney!s breach of duty proximately caused
injury to the client; and

13

4.

14

16

That the attorney either by an act or a failure to act
violated or breached that duty;

11

15

The existence of an attorney/client relationship giving

That the Plaintiff sustained actual injury, loss or
damage.

See Meiselmanf Attorney Malpractice: Law and Proceduref §3:1 at
39

(1980),

and

Bartholomew

v.

Crockett,

475

N.E.2d

1035,

17
(Ill.App.lst~Dist., 1985).

18
As a general rule then, a Plaintiff in a legal malprac-

19
tice

action

must

show

that

"but

for"

the

negligence

of

the

This

is

20
defendant

attorney,

injury

would

not

have

occurred.

21!
simply a restatement of the "proximate cause" element necessary

22
to maintain legal malpractice actions.

For example, Meiselman,

23
supra, at page 42 of his treatise states:

24
25
26
27
28
LAW OFFICES

"•^he term 'but for1 is in effect substituted
for 'proximate cause' when the case involves
legal malpractice.

Stated as simply as poss-

ible, this standard, by its very definition

1

would bar recovery by the Plaintiff/client

2

unless the attorney's negligent conduct caused

3

the alleged injury or harm.

4

Exactly how much

the Plaintiff must show to meet this standard

5

depends on the facts and circumstances of each

6

case."

7
This reasoning appears to have been applied by the Utah

8
Supreme Court in the case of Young v. Bridwell, 437 P. 2d 686,

9
20 Utah 2d 332 (1968) where the Court stated:

10
"The parties are not in disagreement that in

11
order to make out a cause of action against

12
the attorney for failing to advise of their

13
right to appeal, it would have to be shown

14
that there was at least a reasonable likeli-

15
hood of reversing the judgment and that it

16

would have benefitted the Plaintiff."

17

While Utah, in the past, appears to have placed the

18
19

burden of proof on this element upon Plaintiff, some Courts now

20 shift the burden of proof to the Defendant attorney as to the
21

issue of

"meritorious

claim".

See for example Bartholomew v.

22 Crockett, supra, Dings v. Callahan, 602 P.2d 542 (Kan., 1979) and
23 Glidden v. Terranova, 427 N.E.2d 1169

(Mass., 1981).

Glidden,

24 supra, is indicative of the emerging trend to shift the burden of
25 proof
26

27
28
LAW

OFFICES

. BRUCE ALVERSON LTD

on

attorney.

the

issue

of

"meritorious

claim"

:

i the

Defendant

The Court there recognized that where an attorney is

sued by a client for allegedly failing to defend that client's
underlying

litigation, the attorney

should bear the burden of

proving that the client had no defense.

The Court stated:

"We hold that the attorney should indeed bear
the burden of proof in such a case, for "since
the client had no obligation

f

to prove his

case1 in the underlying action (he could have
simply required the Plaintiff to prove his
case), he should not shoulder the burden of
proving a defense in the malpractice action".
(Citations omitted.)

To require the client

to prove the underlying action was defensible
requires him to establish in the malpractice
suit that which he would not have been required to prove in the underlying action."
In any event, whether the traditional or the contemporary approach* is followed, the issue of "meritorious claim" is an
element of liability in legal malpractice actions and any judgment as to liability disposes of the issue of "meritorious claim"
as well.

Indeed, a Plaintiff's claim against an attorney

for

legal malpractice would be dismissed if there was no finding of
"meritorious claim".
Lemon

&

Garguilo

Carter,
V;

See for example Byrd v. Martin, Hopkins,

P.C.,

Schunk,

564

395

F.Supp.

N.Y.S.2d

1425
751

(WD

Va. , 1983)

(1977).

and

Similarly,

a

finding of liability on the part of the defendant attorney is,
necessarily, also a finding of "meritorious claim".

1

II.

2

THE OCTOBER 11, 1983 ORDER GRANTING
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO "ALL ISSUES RELATING TO
. . . LIABILITY" DISPOSED OF THE "MERITORIOUS CLAIM"
ELEMENT IN THE INSTANT CASE

3
4
5

On or about August 10, 1983, WILLIAMS' unopposed Motion

!

6

For Partial Summary Judgment was filed to dispose of the issue of

7
liability.

Attached as Exhibit "1" to WILLIAMS' Motion was the

8
deposition transcript of Attorney Martin Becker who was initially

9
retained to defend WILLIAMS in civil action C-80-8309.

Thus, Mr.

10
Becker was familiar with the lawsuit brought against WILLIAMS and

11
the possible defenses thereto.

According to Mr. Becker, civil

12
action C-80-8309 was "defensible".

(See page 38 of the record.)

13
However,

since

civil

action

C-80-8309

was

brought

in

Third

14
Judicial District Court In And For Salt Lake County, State Of

15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Utah, Mr. Becker referred the case to BARBER to file an Answer
and to otherwise defend and represent WILLIAMS in that matter.
In

his

letter

of

December

29,

1980, Mr.

Becker

summarizes

WILLIAMS' case to BARBER and emphasizes that civil action C-808309 was defensible and that various set-offs existed in favor of
WILLIAMS.

22 of

that

(See pages 49 and 50 of the record.)
correspondence

was

also

attached

to

A complete copy
the

Motion

For

23 Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of liability.
24
25 summary

On or about October 11, 1983, Judge Frederick granted
judgment

on

the

issue

of

liability

on

the

basis

of

26 WILLIAMS' Motion and on the basis that BARBER had not filed any
27 opposition thereto.

The Order granting partial summary judgment

28 states, in pertinent part:
LAW OFFICES
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"IT IS ORDERED that an interlocutory judgment
be, and the same is hereby entered in favor of
the Plaintiff, and against the Defendants,
JAMES N. EARBER, MARTIN VERHOEF & DAVID E.
YOCOM, and each of them, on all the issues in
this action relating to the liability of the
Defendants to the Plaintiff and for such
amount as may be found due to the Plaintiff
as damages which shall be determined at the
time of trial."

(Emphasis added.)

(See pages

57 through 59 of the record.)
As noted above, a finding of "meritorious claim" is an
element of liability in legal malpractice actions and, inasmuch
as WILLIAMS' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment as to liability
contained evidence that civil action C-80-8309 was defensible,
Judge Frederick's order granting partial summary judgment as to
"all issues relating to . . . liability" disposed of the "meritorious claim" element in favor of WILLIAMS.
III.
THE TWENTY SEVEN THOUSAND DOLLAR ($27,000) DEFAULT
JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST WILLIAMS AS A RESULT OF THE NEGLIGENCE
OF BARBER SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN THE DAMAGES
AWARDED TO WILLIAMS
Inasmuch
element

as

of •-. liability

a

finding

and

of

partial

"meritorious
summary

claim"

judgment

as

is an
to

all

issues relating to liability having been entered prior to the
trial to determine damages, the element of "meritorious clai
was disposed

of

in

favor of WILLIAMS

at

the

time of

summary

1

judgment and no further evidence as to this issue was required to

2

be presented at the trial to determine the amount of damages to

3
4
5|i
6

be

awarded.

Therefore,

the

twenty

seven

thousand

($27,000)

default judgment amount entered against WILLIAMS as a result of
the negligence of BARBER in civil action C-80-8309

should have

been included in the damages awarded to WILLIAMS in the instant

7
case.

The lower court's failure to do so was manifest error and

8
the judgment as to damages should be reversed with an order to
9
include the twenty seven thousand dollar ($27,000) default in the
10
damages awarded to WILLIAMS.
11
Furthermore, there is no basis upon which the decision
12
of the lower Court can be upheld.

Under the traditional "but

13
for"

test,

the

lower

Court's

order

against

BARBER,

et. al.

claim"

element

at

time

14
disposed

of

the

"meritorious

the

of

15
16
17
18
19

summary judgment on the issue of liability.
was

not

to

again

address

the

issue

of

"meritorious

claim" at the trial held to determine the amount of damages to be
awarded.
Under the contemporary approach, the burden of proof is

20
21

shifted to the Defendant attorney to show that no valid defense

22

could have been asserted or, in other words, that the underlying

23

claim was without merit.

24

Indeed, BARBER did not even oppose the Motion For Partial Summary

25

Judgment

26

approach,

27

additional evidence on the issue of "meritorious claim" at the

28

trial on damages.

LAW OFFICES

BRUCE ALVERSON

required

Therefore, WILLIAMS

LTD

on

the

issue

WILLIAMS

This was not done in the instant case.

of

would

liability.
not

have

Therefore,

been

required

under
to

this

present

Finally,

1

BARBER'S

failure

to

appear

and

oppose

WILLIAMS' Motion is somewhat analogous to the case of Mendoza v.

2

3 !j Schlossman, 448 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1982), where a default judgment on
I!

4 il the issue of liability in a legal malpractice action was entered
li
5 || against the attorney. The Court held that this disposed of the
i,

A

'I

° JI issue of the lawyer's negligence and of the issue of the validity
7

8

of the underlying claim.

9

Plaintiff

was

required

to

action

but

was

simply

suffered

and

their

10 underlying
11

injuries

12 situation

in

not

Thus, upon assessment of damages, the

the

instant

establish

of

the

to

establish

the

was

precisely

the

required

value.

case.

the

This

The

validity

October

11,

1983

Order

13 granting partial summary judgment on liability disposed of the
14

"meritorious claim" issue and the May 14, 1985 trial was simply

15 required

to

16 Therefore,

establish
WILLIAMS

the

was

injuries
not

suffered

required

to

and

their value.

present

additional

17 evidence on the issue of "meritorious claim" at the trial on
18 damages.
19

Furthermore, the lower Court's decisions as to liabil-

20 ity and damages are not reconcilable.
21 of liability necessarily

includes

The lower Court's finding

the

finding

of

"meritorious

22 claim". Yet, the lower Court's decision of damages excluded the
23 twenty seven thousand dollar ($27,000) default judgment on the
24 basis that no evidence on the issue of "meritorious claim" was
25 presented at the trial on damages.
26

Yet the Court

damages attorney's fees and expenses incurred

27
28

have the default set aside.

awarded

as

in attempting to

If WILLIAM'S claim was not meritor

ous then why were such damages awarded?

If Judge Frederick found

that WILLIAM'S underlying claim was without merit, then he has
awarded attorney's fees and expenses incurred in attempting to
have the default set aside so that WILLIAMS could incur further
expenses in defending a claim for which there was no defense.
This simply does not make any sense and constitutes reversible
error.
Therefore, in light of the foregoing, the twenty seven
thousand dollar ($27,000) default amount must be included in the
damages awarded to WILLIAMS.

WILLIAMS further requests that all

costs, pursuant to URAP Rule 34, and attorney's fees incurred by
reason of this appeal be awarded as well.

!

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing Points & Authorities, Appellant DALVIN J. WILLIAMS respectfully requests that this Honorable
Court

reverse the August

12, 1985

judgment

as to damages and

5 j! further requests that this Court order included in the damages
6

!J awarded to WILLIAMS the twenty seven thousand dollar
default amount

($27,000)

inasmuch as this amount was also the proximate

result of the negligence of Respondent JAMES N. BARBER.
WILLIAMS

further

requests

that

all

costs

and

attorney's

incurred by reason of this appeal be awarded as well.
J. BRUCE ALVERSON, LTD.

By

/^^^2^
ERIC TAYLOR, ESOT
600 S. Eighth Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Attorney for Appellant,
DALVIN J. WILLIAMS
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CHAPTER 3

Proximate Cause In Legal
Malpractice
§ 3:1.
§ 3:2.
§ 3:3.
§ 3:4.
§ 3:5.
§ 3:6.
§ 3:7.
§ 3:8.
§ 3:9.
§ 3:10.
§ 3:11.

Introduction and general principles
Burden of proving proximate cause
The "but for" requirement
The solvency requirement
Case within a case requirement
Contemporary approaches to the case within a case requirement
—Presumption of validity of underlying claim
--Shifting the burden
—The lost opportunity test
—Bifurcation of the legal malpractice action
—Standard of "lost substantial possibility"

§ 3:1. Introduction and general principles.
In a legal malpractice case, the plaintiff must prove:1
1. the existence of an attorney-client relationship giving rise to
a duty;2
2. that the attorney either by an act or a failure to act
violated or breached that duty;3
3. that the attorney's breach of duty proximately caused
injury to the client;4 and
1. Spangler v Sellers (1881, CC Ohio) 5 F
882; Herston v Whitesell (1977, Ala) 348
So 2d 1054; Campbell v Magana (1960, 2d
Dist) 184 Cal App 2d 751, 8 Cal Rptr 32;
Freeman v Rubin (1975, Fla App D3) 318
So 2d 540; Public Taxi Service, Inc. v
Barrett (1976) 44 111 App 3d 452, 2 111 Dec
789, 357 NE2d 1232; Glasgow v Hall (1975)
24 Md App 525, 332 A2d 722; McLellan v
Fuller (1917) 226 Mass 374, 115 NE 481;
Christy v Saliterman (1970) 288 Minn 144,
179 NW2d 288; Carpenter v Weichert
(1976, 3d Dept) 51 App Div 2d 817, 379
NYS2d 191; Lamprecht v Bien (1908> 125
App Div 811, 110 NYS 128, Hansen v

Wightman (1975) 14 Wash App 78, 538
P2d 1238.
2. McGlone v Lacey (1968, DC SD) 288 F
Supp 662; Banerian v O'Malley (1974, 1st
Dist) 42 Cal App 3d 604, 116 Cal Rptr 919;
Berman v Rubin (1976) 138 Ga App 849,
227 SE2d 802.
3. Underwood v Woods (1969, CA8 Mo)
406 F2d 910; Collins v Slocum (1975, La
App) 317 So 2d 672, cert den (La) 321 So
2d 362 and cert den (La) 321 So 2d 363 and
cert den (La) 321 So 2d 364; Seymour v
Cagger (1878, NY) 13 Hun 29.
4. Spangler v Sellers (1881, CC Ohio) 5 F
39
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4. that the plaintiff sustained actual injury, loss or damage.5
This chapter focuses attention on the third element above;
that is, the requirement of causal connection between the alleged negligence of the attorney and the claimed harm sustained
by the client as a result thereof. Although the basic tenets of
proximate cause in a legal malpractice case are essentially the
same as in other negligence cases, the manner in which the
causal relationship is proven is somewhat more complicated.
Undoubtedly, the plaintiff-client's loss must be proximately
caused by the attorney's negligence.8 However, in attorney malpractice, the causal requirement is worded in the negative. For
example, it is often said that the plaintiff can recover against
the defendant-attorney only when it can be shown that the
injury would not have occurred "but for" the negligence of the
lawyer. Thus, the plaintiff must establish that the total or
partial loss would not have occurred had it not been for some act
or omission on the part of the attorney.7 In other words, the
plaintiff must show that "but for" the negligence of the lawyer,
the client's cause of action or defense against a claim in the
underlying action would have been successful.8
882; Walker v Porter (1974, 2d Dist) 44 Cal
App 3d 174, 118 Cal Rptr 468; Lysick v
Walcom (1968, 1st Dist) 258 Cal App 2d
136, 65 Cal Rptr 406, 28 ALR3d 368; Johnson v Haskins (1938, Mo) 119 SW2d 235;
Milton v Hare (1929) 130 Or 590, 280 P
511.
5. Floro v Lawton (1960, 2d Dist) 187 Cal
App" 2d 657, 10 Cal Rptr 98; Coon v Ginsberg (1973) 32 Colo App 206, 509 P2d 1293;
Rubenstein & Rubenstein v Papadakos
(1968, 1st Dept) 31 App Div 2d 615, 295
NYS2d 876, affd 25 NY2d 751, 303 NYS2d
508, 250 NE2d 570; Leavy v Kramer (1962)
34 Misc 2d 479, 226 NYS2d 349; Flynn v
Judge (1912) 149 App Div 278, 133 NYS
794; Fireman's Fund American Ins. Co. v
Patterson & Lamberty, Inc. (1975, Tex Civ
App) 528 SW2d 67, writ ref nre; Widemshek v Faie (1962) 17 Wis 2d 337, 117
NW2d 275.
6. Bonhiver v Rotenberg Schwartzman
(1972, CA7 111) 461 F2d 925; Spangler v
Sellers (1881, CC Ohio) 5 F 882; Lysick v
Walcom (1968, 1st Dist) 258 Cal App 2d
136, 65 Cal Rptr 406, 28 ALR3d 368;
Walker v Porter (1974, 2d Dist) 44 Cal App
3d 174, 118 Cal Rptr 468; Adams, George
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& Wood v Travelers Ins. Co. (1978, Fla
App D3) 359 So 2d 457; Meagher v Kavli
(1959) 256 Minn 54, 97 NW2d 370; Creative Inception, Inc. v Andrews (1975, 1st
Dept) 50 App Div 2d 553, 377 NYS2d 1;
Murphy v Edwards & Warren (1978) 36
NC App 653, 245 SE2d 212, cert den 295
NC 551, 248 SE2d 728; Ward v Arnold
(1958) 52 Wash 2d 581, 328 P2d 164.
Annotation: Attorney's liability for negligence in preparing or conducting litigation, 45 ALR2d 5.
7. Feldesman v McGovern (1941) 44 Cal
App 2d 566, 112 P2d 645; Gambert v Hart
(1872) 44 Cal 542 (ovrld on other grounds
Smith v Lewis 13 Cal 3d 349, 118 Cal Rptr
621, 530 P2d 589, 78 ALR3d 231 (ovrld on
other grounds Re Marriage of Brown 15
Cal 3d 838, 126 Cal Rptr 633, 544 P2d
561)) as stated in Wright v Williams (2d
Dist) 47 Cal App 3d 802, 121 Cal Rptr 194;
Trustees of Schools v Schroeder (1971) 2 111
App 3d 1009, 278 NE2d 431; Titsworth v
Mondo (1978) 95 Misc 2d 233, 407 NYS2d
793; Spangler v Sellers (1881, CC Ohio) 5 F
882.
8. Godbout v Norton (1977, Minn) 262
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proximate cause or a proximate cause. The difference can be
vitally important. Where the proximate cause is required,15 a
defendant may avoid liability by establishing that some other
cause, in fact any other cause, could have played a role in
bringing about the plaintiffs injury. It is obviously to the advantage of the plaintiff-client that a proximate cause be the requirement. The weight of authority demonstrates that the trend
clearly appears to be in that direction.16
Up to this point we know that the plaintiff-client must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant-attorney's negligence proximately caused the injury, loss or harm and
that such injury, loss or harm would not have occurred but for
the negligence of the defendant. Remaining to be discussed is
that which the plaintiff must show in order to prove the element
of causation.
§ 3:3. The "but for" requirement.
Probably the most difficult obstacle on the road to recovery in
a legal malpractice case is the "but for" requirement,17 the
traditional test of causation. The term "but for" is in effect
substituted for "proximate cause" when the case involves legal
malpractice.18 Stated as simply as possible, this standard, by its
very definition, would bar recovery by the plaintiff-client unless
the attorney's negligent conduct caused the alleged injury or
harm. Exactly how much the plaintiff must show to meet the
standard depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.
A small minority of jurisdictions maintain that a plaintiff
must prove his case with "certainty."19 In effect, such a demand
certainty" standard of Flynn v Judge
(1912) 149 App Div 278, 133 NYS 794.
15. Ishmael v Millington (1966, 3d Dist)
241 Cal App 2d 520, 50 Cal Rptr 592;
Christy v Saliterman (1970) 288 Minn 144,
179 NW2d 288; Ward v Arnold (1958) 52
Wash 2d 581, 328 P2d 164.
16. Cline v Watkins (1977, 2d Dist) 66
Cal App 3d 174, 135 Cal Rptr 838; Starr v
Mooslin (1971, 2d Dist) 14 Cal App 3d 988,
92 Cal Rptr 583; Modica v Crist (1954) 129
Cal App 2d 144, 276 P2d 614; Hansen v
•Wightman (1975) 14 Wash App 78, 538
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P2d 1238; Transcontinental Ins. Co. v
Faler (1973) 9 Wash App 610, 513 P2d 864.
17. Comment, New Developments in Legal Malpractice, 26 Am U L Rev 408
(1977); Comment, Attorney Malpractice—A
"Greenian" Analysis, 52 Neb L Rev 1003
(1978).
18. See, Comment, Legal Malpractice, 27
Ark L Rev 452, 466 (1973).
19. Coon v Ginsberg (1973) 32 Colo App
206, 509 P2d 1293; Weiner v Moreno (1973,
Fla App D3) 271 So 2d 217; Better Homes,
Inc. v Rodgers (1961, ND W Va) 195 F
Supp 93.
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1. Attorney and Client &=> 182(3)
Plaintiffs former attorneys had common-law retaining lien on papers in their
possession.
2. Attorney and Client <s=>75(3)
Plaintiffs former attorneys, who had
common-law retaining lien on papers in
their possession, could not be required to
turn over papers to plaintiff's new counsel
prior to hearing to determine whether value
of their legal services was in excess of sums
previously paid to them.

Doris L. Sassower, White Plains (Barton
Denis Eaton of counsel), appellant pro se.
Richard Brill, White Plains, for respondent.
Before MOLLEN, P. J., and LAZER,
MANGANO and NIEHOFF, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.
Appeal from so much of an order of the
Supreme Court, Westchester County, dated
March 11, 1981, as directed appellants to
deliver to plaintiffs new counsel the file in
the action.
Order reversed insofar as appealed from,
on the law, without costs or disbursements
and matter remitted to Special Term for a
hearing to fix the amount of the outgoing
attorneys' lien, if any, and to condition the
turnover upon payment of the sum thereby
found to be due from plaintiff to her former attorneys or the posting of security
therefor. The hearing shall proceed expeditiously.

J ° s e MENDOZA, Appellant,
v#

George M. SCHLOSSMAN, Respondent
Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
Second Department.
March 15, 1982.

Plaintiff appealed from an order and
judgment by the Supreme Court, Kings
County, Lawrence, J., which dismissed his
legal malpractice complaint. The Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, held that default
judgment on the issue of liability in a legal
malpractice action disposes of the issue of
lawyer's negligence and the validity of the
underlying claim, and thus upon assessment
of damages, plaintiff is not required to establish validity of the underlying action but
must establish the injuries suffered and
their value.
Reversed and remitted.

1. Attorney and Client e=> 129(2)
An action for legal malpractice requires proof of the three essential elements
of negligence of the attorney, that the negligence was proximate cause of the loss
sustained, and proof of actual damages.
2. Judgment <s=»126(2)
Default judgment on issue of liability
in a legal malpractice action disposes of the
issue of lawyer's negligence and validity of
the underlying claim, and thus upon assessment of damages, plaintiff is not required
to establish validity of the underlying action but must establish the injuries suffered
and their value.

[1,2] Plaintiffs former attorneys have
a common-law retaining lien on the papers
in their possession, and the circumstances
are not so exigent as to require turnover of
the papers prior to a hearing to determine
whether the value of their legal services is
in excess of the sums previously paid to
them (see Gamble v. Gamble, 78 A.D.2d 673,
DeLukey & Shapiro, P. C, Brooklyn
432 N.Y.S.2d 405; Yaron v. Yaron, 58
A.D.2d 752, 396 N.Y.S.2d 225; Shatzkin v. (Stanley Shapiro, Brooklyn, of counsel), for
Shahmoon, 19 A.D.2d 658, 242 N.Y.S.2d 72). appellant.
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Irving Friedberg, Brooklyn (Norman
Bard, Brooklyn, of counsel; Karen Z. Bell,
New York City, on the brief), for respondent.

87 A D 2d 605
Philippe L. MAITREJEAN et
al., Respondents,
v.

Before LAZER, J. P., and MANGANO,
O'CONNOR and BROWN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.
In a legal malpractice action, plaintiff
appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme
Court, Kings County, entered October 23,
1980, which dismissed his complaint, and (2)
a judgment entered thereon on December 2,
1980.
Appeal from the order dismissed (see
Matter of Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241, 248, 383
N.Y.S.2d 285, 347 N.E.2d 647).
Judgment reversed, order vacated, and
matter remitted to Trial Term for further
proceedings consistent herewith.
Plaintiff is awarded one bill of costs.
[1,2] Where a default judgment is entered against a defendant in a legal malpractice action, plaintiff is not required to
prove the probable success of the underlying action upon an assessment of damages.
An action for legal malpractice requires
proof of three essential elements: (1) the
negligence of the attorney; (2) that the
negligence was the proximate cause of the
loss sustained; and (3) proof of actual damages (see Creative Inception v. Andrews, 50
A.D.2d 553, 377 N.Y.S.2d 1). A default
judgment on the issue of liability in a legal
malpractice action disposes of the issue of
the lawyer's negligence and the validity of
the underlying claim. Therefore upon assessment of damages, plaintiff is not required to establish the validity of the underlying action but must establish the injuries suffered and their value.

O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^

LEVON PROPERTIES CORPORATION
et al., Appellants.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
Second Department.
March 15, 1982.

Defendants appealed from judgment
entered by the Supreme Court, Suffolk
County, Baisley, J., awarding compensatory
and punitive damages against them in action to recover damages for maintenance of
nuisance. The Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, held that award of punitive damages was improper where there was no evidence that defendants were guilty of "quasi-criminal conduct" or of such utterly reckless behavior as would justify award, plaintiffs had not alleged facts demonstrating
malicious intent on part of defendants to
injure plaintiffs, and plaintiffs had not
demonstrated type of gross, wanton or willful fraud or other morally culpable conduct
upon which punitive damages could be
awarded.
Modified and affirmed.

Nuisance c=>50(6)
Punitive damages were improperly
awarded in action to recover damages for
maintenance of nuisance where there was
no evidence in record that defendants were
guilty of "quasi-criminal conduct" or of
such utterly reckless behavior as would justify award for punitive damages, plaintiffs
had not alleged facts demonstrating malicious intent on part of defendants to injure
plaintiffs, and plaintiffs had not demonstrated type of gross, wanton or wilful
fraud or other morally culpable conduct
upon which punitive damages could be
awarded.

Correction page
replaces page 109 - 110
12-18-84
Rule 34.
(a)

AWARD OF COSTS.
To Whom Allowed.

Except as otherwise provided by law,

if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant unless otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by the
Court; if a judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall be taxed
against appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order
is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the respondent unless
otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or reversed
in part, or is vacated, costs shall be allowed as ordered by the
Court.

Costs shall not be allowed or taxed in a criminal case.

(b)

Costs for and Against the State of Utah.

In cases in-

volving the State of Utah or an agency or officer thereof, an
award* of costs for or against the State shall be at the discretion of the Court unless specifically required or prohibited by
law,
(c)

Costs of 3riefs and Attachments, Record, Bonds and Other

Expenses on Appeal.

The following may be taxed as costs in favor

of the prevailing party in the appeal:

The actual costs of a

printed or typewritten brief and attachments not to exceed S3.0 0
for each page; actual costs incurred in the preparation and transmission of the record including costs of the reporter's transcnpr
unless otherwise ordered by the Court; premiums paid for supersedeas or cost bonds to preserve rights pending appeal; and the
fees for filing and docketing the appeal.
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(d)

Bill of Costs Taxed After Remittitur.

When costs are

awarded to a party in an appeal from a lower court, a party
claiming costs shall, within 15 days after the remittitur is filed
with the clerk of the court below, serve upon the adverse party
'and file with the clerk of the court an itemized and verified
bill of costs.

The adverse party may, within 5 days of service

of the bill of costs, serve and file a notice of objection
together with a motion to have the costs taxed by the court
below.

If there is no objection to the cost bill within the

alloted time, the clerk of the court shall tax the costs as filed
and enter judgment for the party entitled thereto, which judgment
shall be entered in the judgment docket with the same force and
effect as in the case of other judgments of record.

If the cost

bill of the prevailing party is timely opposed, the clerk, upon
reasonable notice and hearing, shall tax the costs and enter a
final determination and judgment which shall thereupon be entered
in the judgment docket with the same force and effect as in the
case of other judgments of record.

The determination of the

clerk shall be reviewable by the district court upon the request
of either party made within 5 days of the entry of the judgment.
(e)

Costs

in Other Proceedings and Agency Appeals.

In all other matters before the Court, including appeals from
an agency, costs may be allowed as in cases on appeal from a lower
court.

Within .15 days after the expiration of the time in which
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a petition for rehearing may be filed or within 15 days after
an order denying such a petition, the party to whom costs have
been awarded may file with the Clerk of the Court and serve upon
the adverse party an itemized and verified bill of costs.

The

adverse party may, within 5 days after the service of the bill
of costs file a notice of objection and a motion to have the costs
taxed by the Clerk.

If no objection to the cost bill is filed

within the alloted time, the Clerk shall thereupon tax the costs
and enter judgment against the adverse party.

If the adverse

party timely objects to the cost bill, the Clerk, upon reasonable
notice and hearing, shall determine and settle the costs, tax
the same, and a judgment shall be entered thereon against the
adverse party.

The determination by the Clerk shall be reviewable

by the Court upon the request of either party made within 5 days
of the entry of judgment; unless otherwise ordered, oral argument
shall not be permitted.

A judgment under this section may be

filed with the clerk of any district court in the State who shall
docket a ceritifed copy of the same in the manner and with the
same force and effect as judgments of the district court.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This Rule is a substantial departure from current practice and
rules.
Paragraph (a). This Paragraph provides that the prevailing party
shall generally be awarded costs, unless the Supreme Court orders otherwise. It is not anticipated that written opinions of the Supreme Court
will, after adoption of this Rule, specifically award costs unless
there is a departure from the general rule.

Ill

Paragraph (b). Prior practice under Rule 54(d)(1) allowed costs
against the State, its officers and agencies only to the extent allowed
by law. Rule 33 modifies that concept to allow costs either for or
against the State of Utah, its officers and/or agencies under the theory
that if the State can recover costs, it should also be subject to costs
at the discretion of the Court, unless specifically prohibited by law.
Paragraph (c). The paragraph sets forth with particularity what
costs are recoverable, and raises the allowable costs for each page
of the original brief to $3.00 per page from $2.00 per page under prior
Rule 75(p)(5) URCivP. The words "actual costs" in the paragraph ensure
that parties only seek actual costs where the actual costs are less
than $3*00 per page.
Paracraoh (d?. This paragraph deals with costs on appeal from
lower courts. The rule differs substantially from prior Rule 54(d)(3)
URCivP in that costs are taxed, if an objection is timely made, by
the district court clerk. It is not anticipated that the district
court would be involved in taxing costs unless a party objects to the
district court clerk's taxation of ccsts. The costs taxed by the district court will automatically be docketed as a judgment without the
necessity of a formal motion to enter a judgment for costs. The rule
is self-enforcing, and a party desiring to recover costs must make
a timely filing in the district court or costs are waived.
Paracraoh fe). This paragraph deals with awarding" costs in proceedings other than appeals from district courts, such as original
proceedings and agency appeals. Costs and the taxing of costs are
handled by the Clerk of the Supreme Court in the same manner as" prescribed for the clerk of the district court under paragraph (d) of
this rule, including a review without oral argument by the Supreme
Court if proper application is filed. A judgment for costs in the
Supreme Court may be filed and docketed with any district court in
the State of Utah with the same force and effect as a judgment entered
by the district court.
The provisions of Rule 54(d)(3) and (4) URCivP dealing with the
assessment and taxing of costs on appeal and in original proceedings
before the Supreme Court are repealed as of the effective date of tr.ese
Rules.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DALVIN J. WILLIAMS,

3

3
PLAINTIFF,

3

3
VS.

)

CIVIL NO. 82-4887

3
JAMES N. BARBER, MARTIN
VERHOEF AND DAVID E.
YOCOM, PARTNERS IN THE
LAW FIRM OF BARBER,
VERHOEF 5 YOCOM,

3
3
3
3
3

3
DEFENDANTS.

3

3

DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION
OF
MARTIN BECKER

TAKEN ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF
AT LAS VEGAS, NEVADA
DECEMBER 2, 1982
2:00 P.M.

REPORTED BY:

GARLAND L. WALKER
C.S.R. NO. lkk

B R O W E R AND ASSOCIATES
STENOTYPE REPORTERS
L A S V E G A S . N E V A D A (S910S

6

MRS. WILLIAMS:

NO, IT'S THE $5,000 BONNIE WROTE

TO US FOR INSUFFICIENT FUNDS.
THE WITNESS:

IN FACT, I STILL HAVE THE ORIGINAL

[ OF THAT CHECK, THE D & M ENTERPRISES "CHECK IN MY FILE,
CHECK 327.

THAT WAS WRITTEN BY BONNIE BRUCE TO D 5 M

ENTERPRISES FOR $5,000.
CHECK.

IT WAS A STOP PAYMENT ON THAT

THAT'S SOME OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DEFENSE OF THE

LAWSUIT, I BELIEVE, MRS. BRUCE'S FAILURE TO KEEP HER
AGREEMENT.
Q

(BY MR. MORRIS)

SHOWING THERE WAS A VALID

DEFENSE, AT LEAST AS FAR AS YOU WERE CONCERNED AT THAT
TIME?
A

AS FAR AS I WAS CONCERNED, I FELT THAT THE

ACTION WAS DEFENSIBLE.
Q

THE NEXT PARAGRAPH STATES, "FINALLY, ENCLOSED

YOU WILL FIND MY TRUST ACCOUNT CHECK IN THE AMOUNT OF
$500."

WAS THAT A TRUST ACCOUNT CHECK WRITTEN ON THE

TRUST ACCOUNT OF SORENSON 5 BECKER?
A

CAN WE GO OFF THE RECORD FOR A SECOND.
MR. MORRIS:

SURE.
(OFF THE RECORD BRIEFLY, NOT
REPORTED.)

THE WITNESS:

I'M NOT SURE.

I'M UNCERTAIN

AS TO WHETHER IT WAS THE TRUST ACCOUNT OF SORENSON 5 BECKER
OR JUST THE TRUST ACCOUNT OF PAUL SORENSON PRIOR TO THE
BROW ER AND ASSOCIATES
STENOTYPE REPORTERS
L A S V E G A S , N E V A D A 89102

ATTORNEYS

AT

LAW

J2J LAS >ECAS BOl'LE* ARD
LAS VEGAS.Sl\
TELEPHONE
pFAl'l

SOUTH

ADA 19101
(702)

H5U25

SOPENSON

ARTIS

H

BECKER

iTRICA

X.

DOYLE

December 29, 19 80

REPLYFL/ERTO:

Our

File

No.

5817

£'£~—%fJ&

James Barber, Esq.
Attorney at Law
431 Sounh 300 East
Suite 104
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re: Dalvin J. Williams/C. Grant Morrison/ Bonnie Bruce
Dear Mr. Barber:
Pursuant to our telephone conversation of this
date, enclosed you will find a copy of the Summons and
Complaint served on .Mr. Williams on December 15, 19 80.
Also enclosed you will find the following:
1 ^ A copy of the original Agreement dated
July 12, 1979 between Dalvin J. Williams and Bonnie Bruce.
2. A copy of the Distributor Agreement dated
April 25, 1979 wherein Mr. Williams obtained distribution
rights for those counties of the State of Utah listed on
Exhibit "B".
3. A Distribution Agreement dated July 16, 1979
wherein Dalvin J. Williams, pursuant to his contract with
Bonnie Bruce, obtained distribution rights for the states
of Idaho and Nevada.
4. A demand letter signed by Grant Morrison
and Bonnie Bruce which lias been dated April 19, 1980.
5. Numerous letters dated before and after
the Agreement in question which reflect efforts to market
and test the Acton Energy Control Modules, which is the
subject matter of the Distribution Agreements.
My client indicates that C. Grant Morrison is
a friend of Bonnie Bruce who either loaned her the
$12,000 sum or co-signed so thar M s . Bruce could borrow
those funds. 2^r. Williams has never had any direct contractual relationships with Mr. Morrison in regard to this
matter.

MS&l-BaiaT

/

December 29, 19 80
Pace 2

It is Mr. Williams 1 position that he has mace
all best efforts to comply with the terms and conditions
of his Agreement with M s . Brooks. She"was and is fully
familiar with the product and was at the very least a
fully knowledgable investor.
The problem that existed was that the market
for the Acton Energy Control Modules was very, very
active from the standpoint of major entities who were
willing to try the product on a test basis but ultimately
unwilling to purchase the modules. There are still some
$15,000 worth of retail value modules stored in Salt Lake
City and Mr. Williams would be happy to turn these items
over to M s . Bruce.
My client is not interested.in protracted
litigation, however, he certainly does not feel that he
owes the sum of $12,000 and/or punitive damages to the
Plaintiffs. Mr. Williams feels that he fully and faithfully
plied with the terms and conditions of the
July, Lbf'/b Agreement and without the necessary sales
to .make a sufficient income he was forced to discontinue
business. M s . Bruce is more than welcome to 100% of the
distributorship for the applicable Utah counties as well
as Idaho and Nevada.
Also enclosed you will find a $5,000 check
written to D & M Enterprises and dated February 11, 1980.
You will note, that M s . Bruce has stopped payment on this
check, thereby causing damage to my client. No payment
has ever been received on this check and while Mr. Williams
is not particularly interested in collecting it except for
off-set value, it certainly shows that in early 1980
3onnie Bruce was still sufficiently happy with her dealings
with Dalvin Williams.
Finally, enclosed you will find my Trust Account
Check in the amount of $500.00 as and for an initial
retainer in regard to this matter.
Please advise us as to any additional information you might need and feel free to call Mr. Williams
at his home -number which is (702) 564-7328 or his office
number which is (702) 871-7121.

IRD J U D I C I A L DISTHIUT
CouTTfy
aunty of SairraRe^STate of Utan

Minute Book Form 103

T\a.\\^7r^s. UVWrn
P'aintiff

_
^ ^ O P - -r- ^f> Q<

r> -« \

M<?

Defendant

CASE NO:

)

r*yQ&X*J~(G(^Or\

C^^-^T^H

Supp. Order.
OSC.
Other.
Summons.
Stipulation.
Waiver
Publication.
• Default of Pltf/Deft Entered

Type of hearing: Div.
Annul
Present: Pltf
Deft.
P.Atty:
rfXQv-W
W-n<<\;->
D.Atty:
Sworn & Examined:
Deft:.
Pltf:
Others:

/ / 1 - ^ - T S
Date:
Judge: ~ , ^ ^ ) e > v . \ n
Clerk: "=^ 3 ; -^<V-s
Reporter:
Bailiff: _ -H- ^ u
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ORDERS:
D
•

Custody Evaluation Ordered
Visitation Rights

•
•
•

Pltf/Deft Awarded Support $
x
Pltf/Deft Awarded Alimony $
Payments to be made through the Clerk's Office:.

•
•

Atty. fees to the.
Home To:

•
•
•
•
•
D
•
G
G
Q

Furnishings To:
. Automobile To:
Each Party Awarded their Personal Property
Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Debts and Obligations
Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Insurance on Minor Children
Restraining Order Entered Against.
Pltf/Deft. Granted Judgment for Arrearage in the Sum of $.
90-Day Waiting Period is Waived
Divorce Granted To
As
Decree To Become Final: G Upon Entry
G 3-Month Interlocutory
Former Name of

G

Based on the failure of Deft to appear in response to an order of the court and on motion of PItfs counsel, court
orders
/
shall issue for Deft
Returnable
. Bail.

G

Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, and good cause appearing therefor,
court orders the above case be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice.

C

Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, court orders

•

Custody Awarded To

=
Per Month/Year

•\o^

•^OCrr-ir" o*\
rvo."^ ^ -

Per Month
Alimony Waived

in the amount of.

f^v 2 ^
\\v

•

G v -v

:i—Cv-~\-^

•A C> * < ? ,V<->v \

o

q*r\

•

. Is Restored

s<~y C?<\{^L

-v\/r?_ " ^ > c ' ^ o, \,~
<Cs ?%

~A.<rl> \ \ <XS

Deferred
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\\\J

.J
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FILED iN CLERK'S OFFiCE
Salt Lake County Utah
OCT 111953

i l l MONTE J . MORRIS, ESQUIRE
I P. 0. Box 843
2 HHenderson, NV 89015
l! (702) 564-2503
O ||

H. Dixon (Hincjey. &•!£%$$ Cist. Court
By
Clerk
_ ^Deputy
p

7

Attorney for the Plaintiff
4
5
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

6

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

7
8

9 DALVIN J. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,

10
vs.

11

ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

12'! JAMES N. BARBER, MARTIN
|| VERKOEF and DAVID E.
13IIY0C0M, Partners in the
'law firm of BARBER, VERHOEF
1 4 & YOCOM,
15

Civil No. 82-4837

Defendants.

16
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of

17

|.
1 8 j| Liability, having come before the Court for hearing on the
^19J!3rd day of October, 1983, MONTE J. MORRIS, ESQUIRE, counsel of
20 li record for the Plaintiff, appearing for and in behalf of the

II
2 1 |j Plaintiff; the Defendants not appearing, either in person or by
ji
22.! counsel; the Court finds that notice has been given according to
231! law and this being the time and place for the hearing of this
241; matter and there appearing no objection thereto, Plaintiff's
25 ji motion is granted; and
26 |j

IT IS ORDERED that an interlocutory judgment be, and

271' the same is hereby entered in favor of the Plaintiff, and against
23'ithe Defendants, JAMES N. BARBER, MARTIN VERHOEF and DAVID E.
291! Y0C0M, and each one of them, on all the issues in this action
20

' relating to the liability of the Defendants to the Plaintiff and

31'
32

ss

for such amount as may be found due to the Plaintiff as damages

1

2 which shall be determined at the time of trial.
DATED this ]\

3

day of October, 1983.
BY THE /COURT:

4
5
6
7
8

ATTEST
9

H-OIXONHINDLEY
/

10

By- V

ML

tyClsrfc

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
-20
21 i

I

231

24»
I
25!
j
26'
27 !
28'
29i

I

30
31!
32

Clerk*

-2-

1
2

3sit Uk'3 County Utah

JAMES N. BARBER, #01 $8
MARTIN VERHOEF, # 1 » ^ \
DAVID E. YOCOM, #3£8V,v
Attorneys at Law \ '•;•-.,-.-,
255 East 400 South,\Sujte 100
Salt Lake City, Utah'* 8.4ril
Telephone: (801) 355V-8W.

3

AUG 1 2 i9S5
H. P'*on 7t

rK 3rd D>st. Coun
Deputy o.e.

IN THE THHtD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

4

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

5
6

DALVIN J. WILLIAMS,

7
8
9
10
11

Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
JAMES N. BARBER, MARTIN
VERHOEF, and DAVID E. YOCOM,
partners in the lawfirm of
BARBER, VERHOEF & YOCOM,

Civil NO082-4887

Defendants.

12
13

The captioned matter came on regularly before the Court

14
15

for

16

before the Honourable Dennis J. Frederick, District Judge, sitting

17

without a jury.

18

Esq.

19

trial

on Tuesday, May 14, 1985, at the hour of 10:00

a.m.

Plaintiff was represented by Monte J. Morris,

Defendants, and each of them, appeared pro se.
Opening

statements were heard, witnesses were called

20

and testified on behalf of the plaintiff, plaintiff rested, ana

21

defendants

22

to present.

23

the Court to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint and counsel made closing

24

arguments.

25

foregoing

3ER, VERHOEF
& YOCOM
)RNEYS AT LAW
EAST 400 SOUTH

informed the Court

that they had no further evidence

Thereupon, defendants jointly and severally moved

The Court

announced

its

readiness to rule.

proceedings having been had and good cause

The

therefor

2
1

appearing,

2

following:

t h e Court

3

does

now h e r e w i t h make and e n t e r

the

FINDINGS OF FACT

4

1.

The r e c o r d

of

this

case

demonstrates

that

the

5 Complaint was d u l y f i l e d , s e r v i c e was had upon a l l d e f e n d a n t s ,
6 and answers were duly r e c o r d e d . The a c t s and p r a c t i c e s of which
7 p l a i n t i f f c o m p l a i n s occurred in S a l t Lake C i t y , S a l t Lake County,
8 Utah.
9
10

2.

On or about December 15,

served with

a Summons and C o m p l a i n t

1980, p l a i n t i f f was duly
in c i v i l

action

number

11 C-80-8309 in the Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court of S a l t Lake County,
12 Utah, t i t l e d "C. Grant Morrison and Bonnie Bruce v s . D a l v i n J.
13 W i l l i a m s " , by which p l a i n t i f f s sought to r e c o v e r from p l a i n t i f f
14 h e r e i n t h e p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 1 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 for breach of c o n t r a c t
15 together with other damages.
16
17

3.

On or about January 2,

1981, after

c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h Martin B e c k e r , E s q . ,

h a v i n g had a

of Las Vegas, Nevada,

in

18 w h i c h B e c k e r recommended Barber as an a t t o r n e y to handle t h a t
19 m a t t e r in S a l t Lake C i t y , p l a i n t i f f had a c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h
20 Defendant Barber in which he retained Barber to defend him in the
21

aforesaid

22

Barber the sum of $500.00 as a t t o r n e y ' s

23

action,

4.

and pursuant

At t h a t

24

B a r b e r , Verhoef,

25

professional

to which p l a i n t i f f

herein

paid

fees.

time the firm name under which Defendants

and Yocom operated, as well as t h e i r

and t e l e p h o n e

listings,

letterhead,

p l e a d i n g papers, and their

IER. VERHOEF
i YOCOM
:RNEYS AT LAW
AST 400 SOUTH

no

1

1979-1980

2

between

3

not

4

arrangement

5

Williams

6

Y o c o m when

7

of B a r b e r ' s

8

of law. He did not, therefore, rely on Defendants Verhoef or Yocom

9

in any way in his retention of Barber; and retained Barber

10

business

license

failed

to specify

them other than legal partnership.

partners,

but were

in t h e i r

was not aware
he retained

operating
individual

Barber

relationship

5.

Based

with

Plaintiff

in the practice

person

contractual

14

plaintiff

15

defend

16

in the case of Morrison vs. Williams.

obligation

and payment

3 above, Defendant
to timely

of D a l v i n

of m o n e y

undertook a
on behalf of

and otherwise diligently

J. W i l l i a m s

service

Barber

file an answer

in case number 0 8 0 - 8 3 0 9

T h e initial

solely

recommendation of Martin Becker.

on the c o n v e r s a t i o n

in p a r a g r a p h

6.

of law.

sharing

any other

13

17

practice

office

nor was he aware

described

the interests

a joint

as his attorney;

12

herein

At that time they were

of the existence of Defendants Verhoef O P

in reliance on the individual

11

under

any relationship

as they might

of Summons

appear

in the M o r r i s o n -

18

W i l l i a m s matter w a s improper, and proper service was not effected

19

upon W i l l i a m s

20

that

21

until

h i s answer

on or about January 28, 1981, with the result

thereon was required

Wednesday, February 27,

22

7.

Despite

to be filed

on or before

1981.
his contract

to defend W i l l i a m s ,

23

failed

24

27, 1981, as required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

to file an answer

on behalf

of W i l l i a m s

before

Barber

February

25
3ER, VERHOEF
& YOCOM
DRNEYS AT UWV
EAST 400 SOUTH
SUITE 100

Q O

1

8.

On

2

number

3

James

4

m a d e Findings

5

Williams

6

same having

7

1981.

March

S. S a w a y a , District
of Fact

in a sum
been

9.
12,

about

4,

1981, p l a i n t i f f s ,

in case

C-80-8039, conducted a default hearing before the Honorable

8
9

or

J u d g e , pursuant

and

executed

in excess

a Judgment

of $27,000-00

filed with

During

to which Judge Sawaya

the clerk

the period

of

January

against Dalvin J.

on March 6, 1981, the
the court on March 12,

28, 1981, through March

1981, no correspondence or notice of any hearing or any other

10

matter was served upon either Dalvin J- Williams or James N. Barber

11

giving

12

Williams

either

13
14

of

them notice

of

On M a r c h

answer on behalf of Williams.
11.

No notice

of

the entry

against W i l l i a m s

17

or November

18

upon his Utah Judgment

19

and

20

Williams

21

Service

22

of the entry of the Default Judgment

23

Court

lER. VERHOEF
i YOCOM
RNEVS AT LAW
AST 400 SOUTH
SUITE 100

against

10, 1981, James N. Barber duly filed an

16

25

of Judgment

in favor of Morrison.
10.

15

24

the entry

issued

of

of

the

the Judgment or Default
Williams

until

time P l a i n t i f f M o r r i s o n

October
had

sued

in the state of Nevada, obtained a Judgment,
or garnishment
District

documents

Court

of

thereon

against

Clark C o u n t y ,

Nevada.

documents was the first notice that Williams had

12, 1981.

of M o r r i s o n

three-month

to D e f e n d a n t

1981, by which

these

on M a r c h

in favor

given

execution

out
of

was

of

period

was

for

in the Third Judicial District

No notice of the entry of any
given

filing

to W i l l i a m s
a motion

judgment

or Barber before the

to set aside the Judgment

1

under

2

expired.

3

issuance of notice of entry of the Judgment, Defendant Barber

4

a Motion

5

C-80-8309; and thereafter, filed an additional

6

to Set A s i d e

7

supporting affidavits.

Rule

8
9
10

60(b),
On

or

to

about

Set

Rules

Aside

who

By

had

the

James N. B a r b e r ,

18,

Default

Judgment

January

spoken

of Civil

November

the Default

12.
counsel

Utah

of

him

had

1 9 8 1 , promptly

Judgment

in

already

after

case

the
filed

number

and different Motion

on January 26, 1982, both with

1982 W i l l i a m s

by phone

notifying

Procedure,

and

through

had

procured

other

correspondence with

that he was then representing the ;
i

11
plaintiffs

in this case.

12
13.

No hearing was set on either motion to dismiss until

13
late M a y ,

1982.

Thereafter, a hearing on the motion to set aside

14
the Default

Judgment was held before the Honorable James S. Sawaya

15
on June

14, 1982.

During

the

This m o t i o n was

duly denied on June 18, 1982.

16
interim

between

March

6,

1981, and

trial

hereof,

17
successive writs

of garnishment

were

filed by Plaintiff Morrison

18
against

Dalvin J. Williams with his employer

in Las Vegas, Nevada.

19
During the period of such garnishments, Plaintiff Williams

resigned-

20
his

employment, under pressure to do so, which may or may not have

21
22

been generated,
14.

in part, by the service of said garnishments.
During

1982 P l a i n t i f f W i l l i a m s was unable to meet

23
the

first m o r t g a g e

or

trust

deed

obligation

on his home located

24
in H e n d e r s o n ,

Nevada,

and

therefore, the same was repossessed by

25
IER, VERHOEF
1YOCOM
RNEYS AT LAW
AST 400 SOUTH
SUITE 100

First

Interstate

Bank

to discharge

Williams which was secured

thereby.

the

indebtedness of Dalvin J.

1

15.

2

bankruptcy proceedings

3

the D i s t r i c t

4

which p r o c e e d i n g s were u l t i m a t e l y d i s m i s s e d by r e a s o n of W i l l i a m s '

5

failure

6

there in,

During that

7

16.

under Chapter

by t h e

During

Williams

in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t

of N e v a d a ,

to abide

same p e r i o d P l a i n t i f f

terms

the

of

trial

13 of

8

evidence that

9

a l l e g a t i o n s M o r r i s o n made a g a i n s t

Court

for

t h e Bankruptcy A c t ,

a wage e a r n e r

plaintiff

filed

plan

herein

he had a c o l o r a b l e or m e r i t o r i o u s

entered

adduced

defense

to

no
the

him in c a s e number C-80-8309.

10 A c c o r d i n g l y , P l a i n t i f f Williams has made no showing t h a t had Barbe;
11

timely

f i l e d an answer t h e r e i n , h e , W i l l i a m s , could have p r e v a i l e c >

12 on t h e mer i t s .
13
14

17.
plaintiff

15 B e c k e r ;
16

In a d d i t i o n

paid

$250.00

$500.00

in

to T e r r y

to

the

$500.00

initial

he p a i d

attorney's

Christensen,

to

fees

Barber,

to Martin

Coalville,

Utah,

and

$ 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 t o Monte J . M o r r i s in a t t e m p t s to s e t a s i d e the Judgments

17 o b t a i n e d by M o r r i s o n .
18

18.

The e v i d e n c e a d d u c e d by p l a i n t i f f

is

19

t o show by a preponderance t h a t the l o s s of p l a i n t i f f ' s

20

or t h e r e s u l t i n g

21

h i s b a n k r u p t c y were p r o x i m a t e l y

22

as a r e s u l t

23

sum of

24

and, t h e r e f o r e ,

reduction

of B a r b e r ' s

in h i s

neglect.

such damages o f f e r e d

income,

insufficient
employment

l o s s of h i s home, or

c a u s e d by t h e Judgment

entered

F u r t h e r m o r e , the proofs of

by p l a i n t i f f

are speculative

in n a t u r e

insufficient.

25
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the

^m w^« •>

1

2

Based

upon

the

foregoing

Findings

Court

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

4

1.

5

this

6

here in.

action

7

This
and

2.

Court

personal

Because

has

subject matter

plaintiff

between M a r t i n Verhoef

9

Barber

he

retained

Barber,

Verhoef

11

Accordingly,

12

Verhoef and Yocom, no cause of action.

judgment

Barber

14

the Complaint

15

conduct

16

be entered

17

thereby.

was

be entered

negligent

in favor

in failing

upon

which

of

Defendant

to timely

answer

in this Court, and his said
judgment

should

against him for such damages as were proximately

caused

There

legal m a l p r a c t i c e

is no basis

19

general

20

the facts of this case.

damages

5.

should

in case number C-80-8309

constituted

4.

21

is no basis

or Yocom are liable for any damages suffered by plaintiff.

3.

18

or David Yocom and Defendant

there

10

13

over

did not know of or rely upon any

relationship
when

jurisdiction

jurisdiction over each of the defendants

8

for pain,

Because

of

23

earnings

24

bankruptcy

25

Defendant Barber, plaintiff

the evidence

that

or m o r t g a g e
were

for which

under Utah

suffering,

law for

an award of

or emotional distress under

plaintiff has not proven by a preponderance

22

RNEYS AT LAW
AST 400 SOUTH
SUITE 100

the

hereby enters the following:

3

ER. VERHOEF
iYCCOM

of Fact,

loss of p l a i n t i f f T s
foreclosure

proximately

caused

job,

resulting
by

the reduction
thereform

the negligent

should be awarded no damages

or

conduct

of
his
of

therefor.

8

1

6.

B e c a u s e plaintiff was required to hire attorneys

2

to attempt

3

judgment

4

attorney's

5

paid to Barber.

6
7
8

to set aside the Judgment

in case number

C-80-8309,

should be entered against Barber for the amount of such
fees, i.e. $1,750.00 as well as the $500.00 retained

7.

Plaintiff

is entitled

costs herein.

to judgment for his taxable

.

Dated th is

ft,

(ML •

day of

, 1985.

9
10

ATTEST
H.D#ONHiNOLEY
Clerfc

11
LICT/OQURT JUDGE

Deputy Clerfc

12

CERTIFICATE

LILING

13
14
15
16
17

I hereby c e r t i f y

that

I m a i l e d a copy of t h e

F i n d i n g s of F a c t and C o n c l u s i o n s of Law, p o s t a g e p r e p a i d ,
J. Morris,

attorney

for

plaintiff,

Nevada 89015, t h i s ^ f f ^ d a y

of

foregoing
to Monte

a t P . O. Box 843, Henderson,

QuUf

1985.

18
19

**&&?*

^fa^U^.• *

20
21
22
23
24
25
IER. VERHOEF
1YOCOM
iRNEYS AT LAW
.AST 400 SOUTH
SUITE 100

104

/

Oilt Uk2 County Utah

N. BARBER, #0198
MARTIN VERHOEF, #3326
DAVID E. YOOOM, #3581
Attorneys at Law
255 East 400 South, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-8998
JAMES

1

2
3

-. -.M ot rni"^ O C T -

WiGi2'235
H

p- x o r i i^.jESWJC'.crk 3rd C.st. Court

Deputy o»e> *

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL,DISTRICT COURT

4

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

5
6

DALVIN J. WILLIAMS,

7
8
9
10
11

Plaintiff,
JUDGMENT
vs.
JAMES N. BARBER, MARTIN
VERHOEF, and DAVID E. YOCOM,
partners in the lawfirm of
BARBER, VERHOEF & YOCOM,
Defendants.

12
13
14
15
16

19

the Honorable Dennis J. Frederick, District Judge, sitting without
a jury, on May,14, 1985.
Morris, Esq.

24
25
BER VERHOEF
& YOCOM
ORNEYS AT LAW
EAST 400 SOUTH

Defendants each appeared pro se.

has heretofore made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law.

Based thereon, and good cause appearing:
NOW,

THEREFORE,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED as follows:

22

23

Plaintiff was represented by Monte J.

Evidence was taken and arguments were heard, the Court

20
21

)

The captioned matter came on regularly for trial before

17
18

Civil No. 82-4887

1.
Verhoef

Judgment

is entered

in favor of Defendants Martin

and David E. Yocom against

the plaintiff, no cause of

act ion.

~ 105

2.

1

Judgment

is entered in favor of plaintiff against

2

Defendant James N . Barber for the sum of $2,250.00, together with

3

the sum of $634.46 representing plainti/f's taxable costs herein.
Dated this

4

U/

KDIXpNHINDLEY
/)

7

10
11

Clerk

/A
By

Deputy Clerk

MAILING 'CERTIFICA'
I hereby c e r t i f y

t h a t a t r u e and c o r r e c t

f o r e g o i n g Judgment was m a i l e d ,

12 M o r r i s , a t t o r n e y for p l a i n t i f f ,
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25
IER, VERHOEF j
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SUITE 100

, 1985.

ATTEST

6

9

fMk'

BY TI^E COWT:

5

8

day of

89015, on t h i s y&'^Ajay of C ? ^ £ v

postage prepaid,

copy of

the

to Mr. Monte J.

P.O. Box 8 4 3 , Henderson, Nevada
, 1985.

BARTHOLOMEW v. CROCKETT

ill- 1035

Cite as 475 N.E~2d 1035 (IlLApp. 1 Dist. 1985)

that's a matter of record here, where the
only defense that is being alleged here is
one used as a mitigating factor. It says
here, that the affirmative defense of intoxication is a mitigating factor. Defendant does not claim that it deprived
him of substantial capacity to distinguish
between criminal conduct or conformance of his conduct within the requirements of law/'

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment
and sentence of the circuit court of Henry
County is reversed and the cause remanded
with directions that the defendant be given
a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
HEIPLE, PJ., and STOUDER, J., concur.
= KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

"I just want to make sure that so I don't
have to argue that you're not alleging
voluntary intoxication as an affirmative
defense, just saying use it in mitigation?"
Defense counsel made the following statement in final argument:
"No question whatsoever. I certainly
feel this is a mitigating factor in any
determination by the Court. We're dealing with general intent crimes rather
than specific intent. Consequently, I'm
aware of the differentiation there, your
Honor. However, I would request the
Court to take that into consideration."
[3] The action of defense counsel in attempting to use clear evidence of the defendant's intoxication only in mitigation
amounted to only the formality of a trial
since he had already in effect pleaded his
client guilty, without his knowledge or consent. (People v. Stepheny (1974), 56 I11.2d
237, 306 N.E.2d 872.) By merely going
through the motions of an adversary proceeding, counsel for the defendant ceased
to be an advocate for the accused and
defendant's right to the presumption of
innocence was compromised to the point
that the result was a foregone conclusion.
[4] No matter how strong the State's
evidence may be, counsel for the defendant
must (1) either advise his client to plead
guilty and obtain his knowing and voluntary acquiescence in such a plea, (2) be a
vigorous advocate in his client's defense, or
(3) withdraw from the case. Nothing more
is required of a lawyer, and nothing less is
owed to a defendant.
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131 Ill.App.3d 456
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Jane BARTHOLOMEW,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Lavert CROCKETT, David Wittenberg,
Paul A. Caghan, and Wittenberg & Caghan, Ltd., a Professional Corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 83-2401.
Appellate Court of Illinois,
First District, Third Division.
March 6, 1985.
State employee brought action against
employee of the Board of Trustees of the
University of Illinois for personal injuries
sustained as result of motor vehicle collision and against former attorneys for malpractice in handling the claim. The Circuit
Court of Cook County, Myron Gomberg, J.,
dismissed the complaint as to all defendants, and plaintiff appealed. The Appellate
Court, White, P.J., held that: (1) Board
employee was not immune from state employee's common-law negligence claim
against him, and (2) while plaintiff's claim
against the Board for personal injuries was
precluded because of defendant attorneys'
failure to timely file statutory notice of
claim, such failure did not deprive plaintiff
of a cause of action against Board employee and, since it was not yet determined
whether plaintiff could recover against
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Board employee, it was impossible to ascertain whether attorneys' negligent conduct
resulted in actual damage to plaintiff and
thus, without the element of actual damages, cause of action for legal malpractice
had not yet accrued.
Reversed and remanded in part and
affirmed in part.
1. Workers' Compensation <3>2168
Employee employed by Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois was not an
employee of the state for purposes of provision of the Workers' Compensation Act
precluding common-law action against a
coemployee if the parties come within the
Act and thus, Board employee wras not
immune from state employee's common-law
negligence claim against him for injuries
allegedly sustained in motor vehicle accident which occurred while both employees
were acting in the scope of their employment. S.H.A. ch. 48, H 138.5(a).
2. Automobiles <3>232
A state employee cannot use governmental immunity as a shield to preclude
circuit court jurisdiction in automobile negligence cases.
3. Automobiles <3=>232
Coverage of state employee and the
vehicle by a state-sponsored insurance program had no jurisdictional effect on the
court in which" negligence action was to be
asserted against state employee for injuries sustained in motor vehicle accident
which occurred while employee was acting
in the scope of his employment. 111.Rev.
Stat.1979, ch. 127, U 35.9(/)(3).
4. States <S=>79
State employees are not exempt from
liability for their own acts of negligence
merely because they were acting within the
scope of their employment.
5. Attorney and Client <3=>129(2»
In order to state a cause of action for
legal malpractice, the plaintiff must plead
the existence of an attorney/client relationship; a duty arising from that relationship;

a breach of that duty; causation and actual
damages.
6. Attorney and Client <3=>129(2)
Burden of pleading and proving that
damages resulted from attorney's legal
malpractice entails establishing that but
for the attorney's negligence, the client
would have successfully defended or prosecuted the underlying suit
7. Action <s=>61
.While client's claim against Board of
Trustees of the University of Illinois for
personal injuries sustained in automobile
accident was precluded because of her former attorneys' failure to timely file statutory notice of claim, such failure did not
deprive client of cause of action against
Board's employee who was driver of automobile, and since it had not yet been determined whether client could recover against
Board employee, it was impossible to ascertain whether attorneys' negligent conduct
resulted in actual damages to client and
thus, without the element of actual damages, client's cause of action for legal malpractice had not yet accrued.
Baskin, Server, Berke & Weinstein, Chicago (Susan P. Malone, Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant
Neil Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Chicago (William R. Wallin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago,
of counsel), for defendant-appellee, Lavert
Crockett.
Conklin & Adler, Ltd., Chicago (John S.
Roadhouse and Peter V. Bustamante, Chicago, of counsel), for defendants-appellees
David Wittenberg, Paul A. Caghan and
Wittenberg & Caghan, Ltd.
WHITE, Presiding Justice.
Jane Bartholomew brought this action
against defendant, Lavert Crockett, for
personal injuries sustained as a result of a
motor vehicle collision and against her former attorneys, Paul Caghan, David Wittenberg and Wittenberg & Caghan, Ltd. (Attorneys), for malpractice in handling the
aforementioned claim. Appellant's two-
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count amended complaint was dismissed as
to all defendants.
The amended complaint alleges that on
June 2, 1980, Bartholomew was driving her
automobile in the course of her employment as a nurse inspector for the Illinois
Department of Public Health, going to one
of the nursing homes where she was assigned. She was proceeding in a westerly
direction on Taylor Street in Chicago. She
had come to a complete stop behind traffic
to allow another vehicle to make a left turn
when her car wras struck from the rear by
a motor vehicle driven by Crockett. At the
time of the collision Crockett was operating
a State-owned vehicle in the course of his
employment as a truck driver for the University of Illinois. As a result of the collision, Bartholomew alleges that her car was
damaged and that she sustained extensive
injuries.
The amended complaint further alleges
that on or about June 3, 1980, Bartholomew
retained David Wittenberg and Paul Caghan of the law firm of Wittenberg and
Caghan, Ltd. to represent her in all claims
arising out of the above-mentioned occurrence, against the State of Illinois as her
employer for worker's compensation and
against Crockett and his employer for his
negligence. Thereafter Bartholomew entered into two retainer agreements which
provided for payment to the Attorneys of
20 percent of the award from the Industrial
Commission for worker's compensation
claims and for payment of 40 percent of
the recovery on all other claims.
On January 8, 1981, the Attorneys filed a
statutory notice of claim for personal injuries against the State of Illinois in the
Illinois Court of Claims. This claim was
filed late, more than eight days beyond the
time allowed by statute and named the
State as the defendant instead of the Board
of Trustees of the University of Illinois.
The Attorneys later filed a complaint in the
Court of Claims for property damages
only, identifying Crockett as an agent of
the State. Further, the Attorneys filed a
worker's compensation claim against the
State of Illinois as Bartholomew's employ-

er. They settled her property damage
claim against the State of Illinois, instructing her to execute a general release in
favor of the State and Crockett.
Subsequently, Bartholomew became dissatisfied with the Attorneys' overall performance and discharged them upon learning that they had filed an untimely statutory notice of claim. She then retained the
attorney who is representing her in this
appeal.
Bartholomew's amended complaint in
count I alleged that Crockett was negligent
in speeding, failing to retain control of his
vehicle, and otherwise operating his vehicle
in a negligent manner. In count II of her
complaint, she charged that the appellee
Attorneys failed to file a proper notice of
claim with the Court of Claims, negligently
advised plaintiff to sign a general release,
and improperly named the State of Illinois
rather than the Board of Trustees of the
University of Illinois as the employer of
Crockett.
The trial judge granted Crockett's motion to dismiss on the basis that Bartholomew and Crockett were co-employees, each
acting within the scope of his employment
at the time of the incident, and that the
action is barred by section 5(a) of the
Worker's Compensation Act. (111.Rev.Stat.
1979, ch. 48, par. 138.5.) The judge granted the Attorneys' motion on the grounds
that plaintiff failed to state a cause of
action for malpractice because she had suffered no damages as a result of the alleged
negligence of the Attorneys. This appeal
followed.
Bartholomew argues that the trial court
erred in dismissing her claims because (1)
the Board of Trustees of the University of
Illinois is separate and distinct from the
State of Illinois for purposes of section 5(a)
of the Worker's Compensation Act, (2) an
employee of the Board is not immune from
claims based on his negligent operation of
a motor vehicle because the injured party is
employed by the State of Illinois, and (3)
she stated a cause of action against her
former attorneys for legal malpractice.
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II] The first issue to be considered iss
whether the Board of Trustees of the Uni-iversity of Illinois is a legal persona separate from the State of Illinois. We notee
that at the time of the incident, both Bartholomew and Crockett were acting in thee
scope of their employment. Bartholomewv
contends that Crockett is not an employeee
of the State because the Board is a legal1
entity separate and distinct from the StateB
of Illinois; and that the Board and the9
State are not the same employer for purposes of section 5(a) of the Worker's Compensation Act. She therefore asserts that^
Crockett is not immune from suit on a1
common law negligence claim by her. We3
agree.
Section 5(a) of the Worker's Compensation Act provides in pertinent part:
§ 5. (a) No common law or statutory/
right to recover damages from the em-ployer, * * * or employees * * * for in-jury or death sustained by any employee>
while engaged in the line of his duty as>
such employee, other than the compensation herein provided, is available to anyr
employee who is covered by the provisions of this Act * * *.
(Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 48, par. 138.5(a).))
The Illinois Supreme Court has construedI
this section to mean a common law actioni
against a co-employee is precluded if the\
parties come within the act and the accidental injury arose out of and in the course of•
the employment. Chmelik v. Vana (1964),,
31 I11.2d 272, 201 N.E.2d 434; Brooks v.
Carter (1981), 102 Ill.App.3d 635, 58 111.•
Dec. 534, 430 N.E.2d 566.
It is uncontested that Bartholomew is ani
employee of the State of Illinois. The\
question here is whether the Board of'
Trustees of the University of Illinois, whichi
employed Crockett, can be considered the
State of Illinois under section 5(a) of the
Worker's Compensation Act. On numerous occasions, Illinois courts have discussed the status of the university in relation to the State. The Board has been
described as a public corporation, endowed
1. Section 19f of the Worker's Compensation Act
precludes judicial review b\ the circuit court of

with all the powers and duties of public
corporations and was established by the
legislature for the purpose of conducting
and operating the university. People ex
rel Board of Trustees v. Barrett (1943),
382 111. 321, 46 N.E.2d 951; Spalding v.
People (1898), 172 111. 40, 49 N.E. 993.
In Barrett, our supreme court examined
at length the relationship between the
Board and the State. It held that the
Board, as a corporation, was distinct and
separate from the State. The court concluded that the university is not a State
agency but an agent for the State. "The
distinction, while subtle, is very real * * *
[b]oth State agencies and agents for the
State are created by the legislature, but the
former are governmental in nature while
the latter are proprietary or administrative." (Decker v. University Civil Service
System Merit Board (1980), 85 Ill.App.3d
208, 40 Itt.Dec. 472, 406 N.E.2d 173.) The
Barrett court described the status of the
Board as follows:
[The Board] functions solely as an agency of the State for the purpose of the
operation and administration of the university, for the State. In doing this, it
functions as a corporation, separate
and distinct from the State and as a
public corporate entity with all the powers enumerated in the applicable statutes, or necessarily incident thereto. It
has and can exercise no sovereign powers. It is no part of the State or State
government. (Emphasis added.)
(382 111. 321, 343, 46 N.E.2d 951.) Moreover, in Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois v. Industrial Commission
(1969), 44 I11.2d 207, 254 N.E.2d 522, the
Illinois Supreme Court considered the relationship of the Board to its employees
when the Board attempted to appeal to the
circuit court an award of the Industrial
Commission in favor of an employee. The
employee argued that his claim against the
Board was a claim against the State for
purposes of section 19f 1 of the Worker's
Compensation Act (111 Rev.Stat 1967, ch. 48,
Industrial Commission decisions in all actions
against the State o( Illinois
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par. 138.19f(l).) The Board argued that it
was not an agency of the State of Illinois,
therefore not within the section 19f preclusion. Our supreme court agreed, holding
that claims by university employees were
not the same as claims by State employees
because the Board is a corporation separate
and distinct from the State and subject to
being sued as any public corporation.
Thus, the Board and its employees, unlike
the State or its employees, are permitted to
appeal Industrial Commission decisions to
the circuit court.
The Barrett and Industrial Commission cases are not the only decisions in
which the Board asserted that it is separate
and distinct from the State of Illinois. Recently, the Board asserted the same and
the appellate court adopted the conclusion
of the aforementioned decisions in McKenna v. Board of Trustees of the University
of Illinois (1980), 90 Ill.App.3d 992, 46 111.
Dec. 401, 414 N.E.2d 123, and Decker v.
University Civil Service System Merit
Board (1980), 85 Ill.App.3d 208, 40 Ill.Dec.
472, 406 N.E.2d 173. In these cases, nonacademic employees of the University of
Illinois sought to obtain payment of prevailing wages, contending they were either
State employees, or at least employees of a
State officer, agent or authority. The
court in both cases held that the university
is not an agency of the State within the
meaning of the -Personnel Code (Ill.Rev.
Stat. 1977, ch. 127, par. 391), but is "separate and distinct from the State." McKennay 90 Ill.App.3d 992, 996, 46 Ill.Dec. 401,
414 N.E.2d 123; Decker, 85 Ill.App.3d 208,
214, 40 Ill.Dec. 472, 406 N.E.2d 173.
We conclude that Crockett, who is employed by the Board of Trustees of the
University of Illinois, is not an employee of
the State for purposes of section 5(a) of the
Worker's Compensation Act. Accordingly,
we hold that Bartholomew and Crockett
are not co-employees within the meaning of
section 5(a) of the Worker's Compensation
Act, and that Crockett is not immune from
Bartholomew's common law negligence
claim against him.

Crockett places great reliance on Ellis v.
Board of Governors (1984), 102 I11.2d 387,
80 Ill.Dec. 750, 466 N.E.2d 202; Williams
v. Medical Center Commission (1975), 60
I11.2d 389, 328 N.E.2d 1; and Kane v.
Board of Governors (1976), 43 Ill.App.3d
315, 2 Ill.Dec. 53, 356 N.E.2d 1340, in support of his argument that the University of
Illinois is a State agency. In these cases
the Boards and the Commission were characterized as "arms of the State of Illinois"
(State agencies) for purposes of sovereign
immunity, meaning that claims against
these entities are cognizable exclusively in
the Illinois Court of Claims pursuant to the
Court of Claims Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch.
37, par. 439.8(d).) In neither case was the
court addressing the issue of whether employees of such entities are to be considered State co-employees.
[2] Even assuming arguendo that
Crockett is a State employee, his contention
that all claims against him were required to
be asserted in the Court of Claims is without merit. "An Act in relation to immunity
for the State of Illinois" (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983,
ch. 127, par. 801), precludes the State, not
individuals, from being sued in another forum; nor is Crockett within the exclusive
jurisdictional purview of the Court of
Claims (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 37, par. 439.8). The Illinois Appellate Court, on numerous occasions, has held that non-governmental activities of State employees can
form the basis of a negligence action in the
circuit court, and such claims are not required to be asserted in the Court of
Claims. (Watson v. St. Annes Hospital
(1979), 68 Ill.App.3d 1048, 25 Ill.Dec. 411,
386 N.E.2d 885; Madden v. Kuehn (1978),
56 Ill.App.3d 997, 14 Ill.Dec. 852, 372
N.E.2d 1131.) Similarly, the court in Hoffman v. Yack (1978), 57 Ill.App.3d 744, 15
Ill.Dec. 140, 373 N.E.2d 486, found that the
Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University could be sued only in the Court of
Claims, but that this restriction did not
apply to the employee defendant.
More specifically, Illinois courts have
held that a government employee cannot
use governmental immunity as an affirma-
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tive defense or as a shield to preclude
circuit court jurisdiction in automobile negligence cases. (Hering v. Hilton (1958), 12
I11.2d 559, 147 N.E.2d 311; Gocheffv. State
Community College (1979), 69 Ill.App.3d
178, 25 Ill.Dec. 477, 386 N.E.2d 1141; Pree
v. Hymbaugh (1959), 23 Ill.App.2d 211, 162
N.E.2d 297.) The defendants in each case
were operating motor vehicles on the public
highway in a negligent manner. The opinions in those cases, in effect, stated that
the fact of government employment could
not be used as a shield. The duty imposed
on the defendants was held to be the same
duty imposed on all other persons operating motor vehicles on the public highways.
We believe this to be sound law. In Gocheffy the court specifically noted that:
* * * [T]he acts of negligence alleged to
have been committed by [defendant] relate not to obligations incurred solely by
virtue of his employment with [the state
community college], but rather to duties
automobile drivers owe to one another.
(69 Ill.App.3d at 184, 25 Ill.Dec. 477, 386
N.E.2d 1141.) Accordingly, we hold that
even if Crockett were a State employee, he
could not use his employment as a shield
against suit in the circuit court.
Crockett contends further that a suit
which involves the State's self insurance
plan is a suit against the State and is
cognizable solely in the Court of Claims.
Conversely, Bartholomew argues that the
circuit court does not lose jurisdiction merely because the Board participates in a
State-sponsored insurance program which .
insured Crockett and the vehicle driven by
him.
13,4J We believe the coverage of Crockett and the vehicle by a State-sponsored
insurance program has no jurisdictional effect. Generally, State employees 2 are not
exempt from liability for their own acts of
2. As a driver of a motor vehicle registered to the
State, Crockett is considered a State employee
only for purposes of section 35.9(h). Section
35.9(h) defines employee, inter alia, as:
* * * [A]ny other person while using a licensed motor vehicle owned, leased or controlled by the State of Illinois with the authorization of the State of Illinois, provided the

negligence merely because they were acting within the scope of their employment
See Gocheff, 69 Ill.App.3d 178, 25 Ill.Dec
477, 386 N.E.2d 1141; Watson, 68 111.
App.3d 1048, 25 Ill.Dec. 411, 386 N.E.2d
885; Madden, 56 Ill.App.3d 997, 14 Ill.Dec
852, 372 N.E.2d 1131.
Specifically, in Kaiser v. Emrich (1980),
84 IU.App.3d 775, 40 Ill.Dec. 506, 406
N.E.2d 207, the defendant was a State
trooper who was involved, while on duty, in
an automobile collision in which plaintiffs
were injured. The trooper moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the
circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, relying upon section 35.9(m)(3) of the
Civil Administrative Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.
1977, ch. 127, par. 35.9(m)(3)), the predecessor of section 35.9(/)(3) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979,
ch. 127, par. 35.9(0(3)), which is applicable
here.3 The circuit court refused to dismiss
the complaint, and the appellate court affirmed. The court noted that the statute in
question concerns two situations:
The first involves suits in tort against a
State employee operating a vehicle covered by State self-insurance provisions; in
this situation, the State shall defend, indemnify and hold the employee harmless
against the tort claim, in any proper judicial forum. The second situation expressly involves claims against the State
as a self-insurer, and requires those
claims to be brought in the Court of
Claims.
(Kaiser, 84 Ill.App.3d at 776, 40 Ill.Dec.
506, 406 N.E.2d 207.) The Kaiser court
found that in the former case, jurisdiction
was proper in the circuit court, while in the
latter, the Court of Claims might have sole
jurisdiction.
Crockett contends that the Kaiser case is
inapplicable because section 35.9(m) was
amended subsequent to the holding in Kaiactual use thereof is within trie scope of such
authorization and within the course of State
service.
Hl.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 127, par. 35.9(h).
3.

Section 35.9(0 is presently cited as Ill-Rev.
Stat. 1983, ch. 127, par. 63b4("k).
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ser. We disagree. Although there are numerous amendments to the provision, the
General Assembly retained the provision
that "the State of Illinois shall defend, indemnify and hold harmless such employee
against any claim in tort filed against such
employee for acts or omissions within the
scope of his employment in any proper
judicial forum * * *." (Emphasis added.)
(Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 127, par. 35.9.) It
was this provision as well as the one referring to the Court of Claims upon which the
Kaiser court relied. • Crockett's interpretation of the statute would render the "any
proper judicial forum" provision meaningless if the claims could only be filed in the
Court of Claims. We do not believe the
legislature intended its amendments to render that provision meaningless.
Crockett argues in his brief that Bartholomew's execution of a general release of
claims against him and the State of Illinois
bars this suit. We note that the understanding of the parties was that the release
concerned only the claims for property
damage. Nevertheless, Crockett raised the
issue of the release as a defense. The
record shows, however, that on February
22, 1983, Crockett withdrew the issue of
the release from consideration by the court
and the release is therefore not an issue in
this appeal.
Lastly, Bartholomew argues that the
court erred in dismissing her legal malpractice claim against her former attorneys and
in ordering summary judgment in the Attorneys' favor.
A motion for summary judgment will be
granted if the pleadings, depositions and
admissions on file together with affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. (Federal Deposit Insur. Corp. v.
Maris (1984), 121 Ill.App.3d 894, 77 Ill.Dec.
311, 460 N.E.2d 367.) We believe the Attorneys' right to summary judgment is
clear and free from doubt. Turk v. Village
of Willow Springs (1983), 120 IU.App.3d
800, 76 Ill.Dec. 478, 458 N.E.2d 1132.
475 N E 26—24

[5] In order to state a cause of action
for legal malpractice, the plaintiff must
plead the existence of an attorney/client
relationship; a duty arising from that relationship; a breach of that duty; causation
and actual damages. Cook v. Gould
(1982), 109 Ill.App.3d 311, 64 Ill.Dec. 896,
440 N.E.2d 448; Chicago Red Top Cab
Ass'n. v. Gaines (1977), 49 Ill.App.3d 332, 7
Ill.Dec. 167, 364 N.E.2d 328; Trustees of
Schools v. Schroeder (1971), 2 Ill.App.3d
1009, 278 N.E.2d 431.
[6] Since damage is an element of a
professional malpractice claim that is not
presumed, Bartholomew bears the burden
of pleading and proving that damages resulted. This burden entails establishing
that "but for" the attorneys' negligence,
the client would have successfully defended or prosecuted the underlying suit. Zych
v. Jones (1980), 84 Ill.App.3d 647, 40 111.
Dec. 369, 406 N.E.2d 70; Miller v. Schultz
(1977), 53 IlLApp.3d 721, 11 Ill.Dec. 533,
368 N.E.2d 1141.
[7] We agree that Bartholomew's claim
against the Board for personal injuries is
precluded because of her former attorneys'
failure to file timely statutory notice of
claim. However, this failure did not deprive Bartholomew of a cause of action for
her personal injuries against Crockett. As
we have held in this appeal, she has a valid
cause of action against him for her personal injuries.
Since it is yet to be determined (by the
trial court in her revived claim) whether
Bartholomew may recover against Crockett, it is impossible to ascertain whether
the Attorneys' negligent conduct resulted
in actual damages to her. Bartholomew
will have sustained actual damages for a
cause of action in legal malpractice only
after she fails to recover or fails to fully
recover on her personal injury claim
against Crockett or if the release defense,
which is not before us, is ultimately sustained.
On this basis, Bartholomew, in her complaint, failed to meet her burden of pleading sufficient facts showing that damages
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resulted from the Attorneys' failure to file
timely the statutory notice of claim for
personal injuries against the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. (Zych, 84
Ill.App.3d 647, 40 Ill.Dec. 369, 406 N.E.2d
70.) Without the element of actual damages, Bartholomew's cause of action for
legal malpractice has not yet accrued and is
therefore non-existent. (Schroeder, 2 111.
App.3d 1009, 278 N.E.2d 431.) Accordingly, we hold that the court below properly
found that Bartholomew failed to show
that she suffered any damages as a result
of the Attorneys' conduct and summary
judgment for the Attorneys was properly
granted.
For the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the summary judgment entered for
defendant in count I and remand; and we
affirm the summary judgment entered for
defendants in count II.
REVERSED and REMANDED IN PART
and AFFIRMED IN PART.
McGILLICUDDY and RIZZI, JJ., concur.
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131 Ill.App.3d 446
86 Ill.Dec. 663
James G. POSKOZIM,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
MONNACEP, Dave Jacobs, Maine Township High School District 207, James
Miglore Niles Township High School
District 219, Northfield Township High
School District 225, Oakton Community College District 535, and Sky Sports,
Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

brought action against joint venture of
school districts and community college district which offered course as part of adult
education program, corporation which provided course, and individual instructors and
supervisors. Defendants filed motion to
dismiss complaint. The Circuit Court,
Cook County, Myron T. Gomberg, J., granted motion and appeal was taken. The Appellate Court, Jiganti, P.J., held that exculpatory agreement signed by adult student
was unambiguous and exonerated all defendants from liability arising out of skydiving
class.
Affirmed.

1. Contracts <s>114
Where exculpatory agreement specifically set forth in clear language range of
activities to which it applied and parties to
be included thereunder, exculpatory agreement signed by adult student parachutist
was enforceable as to claims based on negligence.
2. Contracts <s=>189
If there was any misconduct on part of
school districts offering adult education
parachuting program, and their instructors,
in their adult approval of adult student's
use of boots for parachute jump, such conduct was instructional, and therefore, as exculpatory agreement signed by student who
broke his leg on first jump was explicit in its
exculpation of all matters having to do with
instructions, approval of boots formed no
b&sis of liability on part of school districts
and other defendants.

March 7, 1985.

3. Contracts <£=114
Exculpatory agreements are strictly
construed, and agreement protecting one
from consequences of his own negligence
must be expressed in clear, explicit and
unequivocal language showing that such
was intent of parties.

Adult parachute student, uho was injured v*hile making parachute jump,

4. Release <S=>29(1)
Where exculpatory agreement signed
by adult student parachutist specificalh ex-

Nos. 83-1594, 83-2185.
Appellate Court of Illinois,
First District, Fourth Division.
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20 Utah 2d 332
Marvin YOUNG and Stella Young, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Apoeliants,
v.
George BRIDWELL, Defendant

and Respondent.
No. 10774.
Supremo Comt of Utah
Feb 20, 10GS

Clients sued attorne> for damages allegedly caused by failure to properly perform his duties for them. The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Stewart M.
Hanson, J , entered judgment for attorney,
and clients appealed The Supreme Court,
Anderson, District Judge, held that where it
did not appear that judgment of district
court would be re\ersed on appeal with any
degree of assurance by adhering to ordmarv
standards of professional competence, the~e
was no affirmatne duty upon attorney to
advise his clients to take an appeal, a n d
where there was no agreement with or indication from clients that appeal should be
taken, attorney could not bz liable for any
damages that might ha\ e resuhed from failure to take appeal.
Affirmed.
1. Attorney and Client C=>! 15

One employing another to perform
some work requiring special skill, such as an
attorney, though chcnt is by that contract
entitled to attorneys personal services and
to refuse those of an associate, must be he'd
to have waived right to attorneys personal
assistance where facts show attendance
with an associate, without objection, at a
hearing or trial where services contemplated by their employment contract were to be
rendered.
2. Evidence C=>5(2)
It is well known generally that law>ers
# office together and cooperate and assist one
another at times in working on their cases.
3. Attorney and Client C=>l 15

Clients who allowed associate of attorne> hired b) clients to appear at trial and to

represent him without objection w a n e d
r ^ht to be represented by the one with
whom contract was first made.
4. Attorney and Client C=>1I5

If there was am deficiency in preparation b^v office associate of attorney at time
of pretrial and breach of contract for represenfa*ion b\ associate in assigning it to him
for handling without consent of clients, it
was rot actionable in and of itself because
trial court ga\ e associate opportunity to reMew 't at trial whe^ his assistance was acquiesced in by clients
5. Attorney and Client <Ol29(2)

In order to make out cause of action
against attorney for failing to advise clients
of their nght to appeal, it would have to be
shown that there wras at least a reasonable
like! hood of reversing the judgment and
that reversal would have benefited the
chents
6. Landlord and Tenant 0 8 6 ( 2 )

\ \ here lease contains clause granting
lessee option to require of lessor an extension of W s c period, but subject to arbitration so far as rent is concerned and where
leasee gives notice of intention to exercise
right of extension, this is binding on lessor
in so far as term of lease is concerned.
7. Landlord and Tenant C=>86(4)
Where rate of rental is subject to arbitration and lessor has given notice of refusal to accept old rate of rental and advised
that failure to agree to proposed increase
would result in actuation of action pending
to terminate lease, mere acceptance of
monthl> rental at old rate would not in and
of lt^eU" ncccssanh constitute waiver of his
right to negotiate new rate of rental as lease
provide:.
8. Attorney and Client <©=»! 12

Where clients made no indication that
attorne> was to represent them on appeal,
attorne> is under no obligation to pursue an
appeal on behalf of his client.
9. Attorney and Client C=»I09

If it was established that trial court had
e itered a ruling manifestly against general
law on subject, as determined by Supreme
Court, or in contravention of express statu-
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lory or constitutional provision, and this
fact was discoverable upon reasonable
professional research by counsel, upon such
a showing a duty conceivably might arise on
part of counsel at least to so inform his
client even though there was no agreement
or indication that attorney was to represent
client on appeal.
10. Attorney and Client <S=>107
Counsel is required to possess ordinary
legal knowledge and skill common to members of his profession, but he is not required
to know all of the law, nor to second guess
trial judge.
11. Attorney and Client <&=! 12

Where it did not appear that judgment
of district court would be reversed on appeal with any degree of assurance by adhering to ordinary standards of professional
competence, there was no affirmative duty
upon attorney to advise his clients to take
an appeal and where there was no agreement with or indication from clients that
appeal should be taken, attorney could not
be liable for any damages that might have
resulted from failure to take appeal.

Stewart, Topham & Harding, Ray M.
Harding, Salt Lake City, for appellants.
Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., Salt Lake City for
respondent.
ANDERSON, District Judge.
The plaintiffs Young sue defendant
George Bridwell for damages allegedly
caused by his failure to properly perform
his duties for them as a lawyer. Upon a
trial to the court judgment was rendered
against the plaintiffs and they appeal.
The plaintiffs engaged Mr. Bridwell to
represent them in a case the facts of which
a r e in summary as follows:
Marvin and Stella Young, his wife, plaintiffs herein, on April 4, 1959, purchased the
property at 4430 South 9th East from Anthony and Mary Baker. The projperty at
that time was subject to a lease to F. Hyde
and Betty Lucille Mortensen, dated August
10, 1957, for a period of five years, and re-

newable at the option of the lessee, except
that the rent was subject to arbitration for
the second five year period.
On September 27, 1961, said Youngs sued
the lessees, the Mortensens seeking to terminate the lease because of alleged violations of the lease agreement by said lessees.
At the time of the filing of this complaint,
Mr. Tom Metos and Mr. Mark Miner, attorneys, represented them. An answer was
filed for defendants November 3, 1961, by
Mr. Bernard Rose, attorney. A reply was <
filed by Mr. Metos and Mr. Miner November 8, 1961. With the case at issue nothing
further happened until March, 1962, when
plaintiffs' attorneys gave notice of taking
the deposition of the defendants.
On August 24, 1962, a withdrawal of
counsel was effected with notice given to all
concerned. George Bridwell became attorney of record and apparently had already
rendered services prior to the filing of the
withdrawal. The file shows by affidavit of
the plaintiffs that defendants Mortensen by
their attorney, Bernard Rose, gave notice of
intention to continue to occupy the premises
under the lease by a letter to Mr. Bridwell
in July of 1962, prior to the expiration of
the five-year term of the lease. The terms
of the letter offered the same rent of $150 a
month, or, if refused, proposed that as provided in the lease the amount be arbitrated.
Mr. Bridwell, according to the affidavit,
responded in behalf of plaintiffs Young by
a letter indicating that the lease could be renewed for an additional five-year period
only if it w as agreed they would pay as rent
the sum of $450 a month, and if not acceptable, that the letter was to be considered a
notice to quit the premises by the end of the
lease period, to-wit, August 10, 1962. The
letter further warned that if this arrangement was not accepted the suit to terminate
the lease filed September 27, 1961, that
would be activated.
There is no evidence that any response
was made to this last letter, or that the parties did anything further to explore arbitration to resolve the amount of the rent. Subsequently, payments of $150 per month were
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accepted by the plaintiffs Young without
further objection up to the ultimate date of
trial on January 7, 1963.
A pretrial of the matter was held on November 30, 1962, at which time the Youngs
were represented by Mr. BridweH's office
associate, Mr. Alan D. Frandsen. The record does not show that his appearance was
made with them present or that they had expressly or impliedly consented to or acquiesced in their being represented at that
time by him. Judge Ellett's pretrial order
ruled that as a matter of law the acceptance
of the first rental payment after August 10,
1962, constituted a renewal of the lease for
a new period of five years as allowed in the
option in the lease. The court was not advised at the pretrial, so far as the record
discloses, of the exchange of letters between
counsel on the question of renewal ^ n d the
rent to be charged, nor of an order purportedly prepared by Alan D. Frandsen, ordering that the rental payments of $150 be paid
into court. There is no evidence such an
order was signed, but it must be assumed
from the tenor of thelast-referred-t 0 order
that Mr. Frandsen knew of it and had in
mind getting the order signed to avoid any
legal inference that might arise of waiver
of the right to negotiate the renewal of the
lease and/or the rate of the rent if the payments were received and kept by the
Youngs. The evidence indicates that the
Youngs did continue to receive ths rental
payments at the old rate.
At the trial of the matter on January 7,
1963, Mr. Frandsen represented the Youngs
without objection on their part so fa*- as the
record is concerned. At this tirne Mr.
Frandsen took issue with the trial Court on
its ruhng at the pretrial that acceptance of
the rent constituted a renewal of the lease
at the old terms. The court acknowledged
that it could reconsider the ruling n^ade at
the pretrial hearing and asked Mr. Fi-andsen
for law to the contrary. He cited SQme authority and then had a discussion with the
court off the record. The court tc)0k the
matter under advisement. At the conclusion of the trial the court stated that it was

still of the opinion that it would be immaterial to grant Mr. Frandsen's request to
amend the pretrial order. The issue of
whether or not there was a breach of the
lease the judge handled by saying: "I still
think that by accepting the payment that he
would have waived that, even had it been a
breach."
On February 23, 1965, the Youngs filed
suit against Mr. George Bridwell claiming
breach of contract in representing them. It
was claimed that his negligence and that of
Mr. Frandsen's in the way the suit against
the Mortensens was handled, and his failure
to appeal the court's-claimed erroneous ruling, or to fail to advise them of the court's
error, and/or to advise them to appeal,
caused them to lose the right to renegotiate
the rate of rental of the lease during the extended period to their damage in the sum of
$15,000. On November 4, 1966, Judge
Stewart Hanson ruled in this suit that the
action should be dismissed.
In the suit to terminate the lease, on October 31, 1966, Judge Stewart Hanson heard
a motion to strike judgment and for new
hearing, argued by Ray M. Harding for
plaintiffs and Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., for
defendant. The court denied the motion
and found that an appeal would have been
of no avail to plaintiffs and that therefore
plaintiffs were barred from seeking recovery in this action against Mr. Bridwell.
From the foregoing it clearly appears that
while Mr. Frandsen may not have been asv
well apprised of the facts at the time of pretrial as Mr. Bridwell, the court gave him opportunity at the trial to argue whether or
not payment and receipt of rent at the old
rate was conclusive of the matter. He cited
authorities supporting a view opposite to the
view taken by the judge, and the judge
nonetheless did not change his view. This
result was reached at a hearing at which the
Youngs were present. The record discloses
no objection on their part to representation
by Mr. Frandsen.
[1-3] In no way is it disclosed by appellants how Mr. Br id well's presence might
have made the difference. But in any event
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one employing another to perform some
work requiring special skill, such as an attorney, though he is by that contract entitled
to his personal services and to refuse those
of an associate, must be held to have waived
the right to his personal assistance where
the facts show attendance with an associate,
without objection, at a hearing or trial
where services contemplated by their employment contract were to be rendered, as is
the case here. One who appears at a dentist's office and finds his regular dentist is
on vacation and has assigned the work to an
associate in the office, and who then voluntarily permits the associate to proceed can
hardly complain of breach of contract by
the first. The same must apply to other
professional services. It is well known generally that lawyers office together and
cooperate and assist one another at times in
working on their cases. While the services
of an attorney are personal and* a client
would be justified in refusing the assistance
of an associate, such services as are knowingly accepted certainly constitute a waiver
of the right to be assisted in those respects
by the one with whom the contract was first
made.
[4] If there was any deficiency in the
preparation of Mr. Frandsen at the time of
pretrial and a breach of contract for representation by Mr. Bridwell in assigning -it to
him for handling without consent of the
Youngs, it was not actionable in and of itself because the court, as explained above,
gave Mr. Frandsen opportunity to review it
at the trial when his assistance was acquiesced in by the Youngs. The letters of
Mr. Rose and Mr. Bridwell, written in July,
1962, and exchanged in dispute over the renewal of the lease and the rate of rental, do
not appear to have been mentioned to the
court at the pretrial or trial, though bearing
upon the subject. Of course, they could
have been mentioned when the court was
off the record. Nonetheless, they are not
such facts as would reasonably appear to
have had any influence on the court since
payments at the old rate were made after
the letters as claimed and the court said that
437 P.2d—AA

it was of the opinion that this fact of payment would be conclusive of the matter
"even had it been a breach." In effect the
court is saying that in its opinion even if
plaintiff in the suit to terminate the lease
could establish a breach, the acceptance of
the payments would renew the lease at the
old terms.
[5] Appellants next contend that the
court below erred in ruling that the results
would not have been different on appeal in
the original case and therefore an appeal
would have been of no avail. The parties
are not in disagreement that in order to
make out a cause of action against the attorney for failing to advise of their right to
appeal, it would have to be shown that there
was at least a reasonable likelihood of reversing the judgment and that it would have
benefited the plaintiff. Appellants in their
brief cite authorities upon which they argue
that where a lease contains an option on the
part of the lessee to extend the lease for an
additional period, but makes the rental subject to negotiation or arbitration, as in this
case, receiving rentals at the old rate, particularly if there was any notice of the fact
that lessor would not permit the old rate to
continue, would not automatically extend
the lease on the old terms. (45 A.L.R.2d
827)
[6-8] Where, as here, a lease contains a
clause granting the lessee the option to require of the lessor an extension of the lease
period, but subject to arbitration so far as
the rent is concerned, and where the lessee
gives notice of intention to exercise the
right of extension, this is binding on the les~
sor insofar as the term of the lease is concerned. Where, as here, the rate of rental
is subject to arbitration, and the lessor has
given notice of refusal to accept the old rate
of rental and advised that failure to agree
to the proposed increase would result in activation of the action pending to terminate
the lease, the mere acceptance of a monthly
rental at the old rate would not in and of itself necessarily constitute a waiver of his
right to negotiate a new rate of rental as the
lease provides. It is unnecessary for us to
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be concerned however with whether the
trial court's decision in the prior case might
have been reversed, because even if that
fact be assumed, there is another aspect of
this case which supports the result reached
by the trial judge in the instant case and
precludes the plaintiff's recovery. This
court has ruled in the Backman case (Lundberg v. Backman, 11 Utah 2d 330, 35S P.2d
987) that an attorney is under no obligation
to pursue an appeal on behalf of his client
unless there has been some agreement or indication from the client that the attorney
was to represent him on appeal. There is
no evidence in this instance that such was
the case.
[9,10] If it was established that the
trial court had entered a ruling manifestly
against the general law on the subject, as
determined by our Supreme Court, or in
contravention of express statutory or constitutional provision, and this fact was discoverable upon reasonable professional research by counsel, upon such a showing a
duty conceivably might arise on the part of
counsel at least to so inform his client even
though there was no agreement or indication the attorney was to represent the client
on appeal. However, in this case there is
no such established error giving rise to the
duty of counsel to advise his client of the
eight to appeal. Counsel is required to possess the ordinary legal knowledge and skill
common to members of his profession, but
he is not required to know all of the law,
nor to second guess the trial judge.
[11] Inasmuch as it is not made to appear in this case that by adhering to the ordinary standards of professional competence it could have been determined with
any degree of assurance that the judgment
of the district court in the prior case would
be reversed, there was no affirmative duty
upon the defendant attorney to advise his
client to take an appeal, nor is it shown that
there was any agreement with or indication
from the client that the appeal should be
taken. It therefore follows that the judgment should be, and it is hereby affirmed.
Costs to defendant (respondent).

CROCKETT, C. J., CALLISTER and
T U C K E T T , JJ., and L E W I S J O N E S , District Judge, concur.
H E N R I O D , J., does not participate.
E L L E T T , J., being disqualified, does not
participate.
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Maxwell E. RICH, Plaintiff,
v.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a municipal corporation of the State of
Utah, Defendant.
No. II117.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 20, 100S.

Original prohibition proceeding instituted by taxpayer to prevent Salt Lake City
from acquiring and operating a mass transit
system and from entering into contract with
private bus lines for purchase of the system.
The Supreme Court, Tuckett, J., held that
statute providing that cities may construct,
maintain and operate or purchase or lease
street railways authorized city to acquire
and operate the transportation system.
Petition denied.
Henriod and Callister, JJ., dissented.
!. Municipal Corporations €=>273'/2
Legislature by granting cities power to
operate and acquire street railways intended
to empower city to furnish public transportation of passengers over city streets by rail
or otherwise; overruling Utah Rapid Transit Co. v. Ogden City, 89 Utah 546, 58 P.2d
1. U.C.A.1953, 10-S-14.
2. Municipal Corporations C=>27V/2, 718
Under statute providing that cities may
construct, maintain and operate or purchase
or lease street railways, Salt Lake City, a

542

Kan.

602 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES
4 Kan App 2d 36

Raymond H. DINGS, Appellant,
v.

an abuse of discretion in the property division.

No. 50768.

4. Judgment <3=»181(1)
Where there is no material dispute as
to the controlling issue, summary judgment
is proper.

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

Syllabus by the Court

Nov. 9, 1979.

An actionable claim against an attorney for professional malpractice asserting
failure to prosecute an appeal or protect the
client's rights to appeal from an unfavorable judgment or order requires proof that
had a timely appeal been taken, a reversal
or more favorable judgment would have
resulted.

John CALLAHAN and Russel N.
Barrett, Appellees.

Review Denied Dec. 4, 1979.
Ciient brought malpractice action
against attorneys who represented him in
connection with the property division aspect
of a prior divorce proceeding. The Sedgwick District Court, Charles Stewart, J.,
assigned, entered summary judgment for
the attorneys, and the client appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Rees, J., held that where
a review of the record compelled the conclusion that there was no possibility an appellate court would have reversed or found an
abuse of discretion in the property division,
the attorneys could not be held liable for
legal malpractice for alleged failure to prosecute an appeal or to advise the client that
an appeal must be commenced within 30
days.
Affirmed.
1. Attorney and Client <^ 129(4)
Causally related damage is an essential
element of a claim for legal malpractice.
2. Attorney and Client e=> 129(2)
An actionable claim against an attorney for professional malpractice based on
failure to prosecute an appeal or protect the
client's rights to appeal requires proof that
had a timely appeal been taken, a reversal
or more favorable judgment would have
resulted.
3. Attorney and Client <3=>112
Attorneys who represented husband in
connection with property division aspect of
divorce proceeding were not liable for legal
malpractice for failure to prosecute an appeal or protect husband's rights to appeal
where there was no possibility that an appellate court would have reversed or found

Fred W. Phelps, Jr., of Fred W. Phelps—
Chartered, Topeka, for appellant.
William Tinker, Jr., of McDonald, Tinker,
Skaer, Quinn & Herrington, Wichita, for
appellees.
Before REES, P. J., and ABBOTT and
SPENCER, JJ.
REES, Judge:
Plaintiff appeals from an adverse summary judgment in a malpractice action
against two lawyers, Callahan and Barrett
As the case comes before us, it is targeted
at Barrett. There is no contention discovery was incomplete.
After representation by two other lawyers in a Cowley County divorce action
brought by his ex-wife in 1972, plaintiff
contacted Barrett in November, 1975. It
appears there then remained as part of the
property division issue the question of equal
division of seventeen jointly owned tracts
of real estate, each of which was subject to
a contract for sale. Barrett was contacted
for the purpose of representing plaintiff at
a hearing to be held on January 30, 1976,
regarding the judicial distribution between
plaintiff and his ex-wife of the sellers' interests in the contracts. Callahan appeared
for plaintiff at the hearing and we treat
Callahan's appearance for plaintiff as hav-
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ing been on behalf of Barrett The evidentiary hearing was recessed. With and without their clients present, counsel conferred
concerning possible agreed distribution of
the contracts. The hearing was adjourned
upon the trial court being advised by counsel a settlement had been reached.
The direct evidence of record is that the
trial judge was not informed of the proposed terms of settlement. Plaintiff is of
the belief and alleges the judge was told
the terms. Even if this were true, it is of
no significance in view of our disposition.
Upon leaving the court house, Callahan
and plaintiff discussed the proposed distribution and plaintiff objected vehemently.
Thereafter the ex-wife's counsel prepared
and forwarded a proposed journal entry
that was not approved and returned or
presented to the court. In March, Barrett
filed a motion for further hearing. It came
on for hearing on April 30. At that hearing, plaintiff testified in specific and complete detail with regard to the unpaid principal balance owed on each of the contracts
and the gross amount of principal and interest to be received on each contract assuming no prepayment. Each contract permitted prepayment without penalty. It was
and continues to be plaintiffs contention
that neither the distribution proposed on
January 30 nor the subsequently ordered
distribution is an equal distribution because
of a sizeable difference between the totals
of the then computed amounts representing
principal and interest to be received in the
absence of prepayment and assuming full
and complete payment by the purchasers.
The April hearing was concluded by the
trial judge's request for submission of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law. The ex-wife's counsel presented his
position in this regard by a May 6 letter to
the court On May 29, Barrett and plaintiff
conferred with respect to their proposed
findings and conclusions; the meeting was
discordant and resulted in a termination of
their attorney-client relation. Seemingly
using a draft prepared by Barrett, plaintiff
prepared and submitted to the trial judge
his proposed distribution. Plaintiff's May

31 transmittal letter to the judge referred
to Barrett as his "former attorney" and the
record in the case before us discloses with
crystal clarity that from and after May 29
plaintiff understood that Barrett and he
had no relationship as attorney and client
and conducted himself accordingly.
On July 21, following receipt of the posthearing letter from the ex-wife's counsel
and plaintiff's suggested findings and conclusions, the trial judge in the divorce case
entered his order of itemized distribution of
the subject real property interests, the contracts; the judge promptly sent copies of
the order to the ex-wife's counsel and to
plaintiff personally; no copy was sent to
Barrett and at no material time did he
learn of the order. The ordered distribution was not and is not to plaintiff's liking;
he views it as not substantially equal.
Around the first of September, 1976, plaintiff conferred with and retained other counsel. Their effort to appeal was unsuccessful; the attempted appeal was dismissed by
our Supreme Court as untimely.
The theory of the present action, alleged
in both negligence and contract is that Barrett not only failed to prosecute an appeal
but that he did not advise plaintiff of the
requirement that an appeal must be commenced within thirty days following the
entry of the order sought to be reviewed.
Within his various arguments, plaintiff contends that after May 29 Barrett had continuing professional responsibility to plaintiff
because there was no court approved withdrawal of appearance by Barrett pursuant
to Rule 117, 220 Kan. lx, and DR 2 110(A)(1), 220 Kan. cxvi.
[1] It makes no difference whether the
action is said to be for negligence or breach
of contract; causally related damage is an
essential element of the claim. We affirm
the trial court on this single dispositive
point.
[2] An actionable claim against an attorney for professional malpractice assert-v
ing failure to prosecute an appeal or protect
the client's rights to appeal from an unfavorable judgment or order requires proof
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that had a timely appeal been taken, a
reversal or more favorable judgment would
have resulted. Chicago Red Top Cab Ass'n
v. Gaines, 49 Ill.App.3d 332, 333-334, 7 111.
Dec. 167, 364 N.E.2d 328 (1977); C/M of
Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Wood, 341 So.2d 1181,
1182 (La.App.1976); Pusey v. Reed, 258
A.2d 460, 461 (Del.Super.1969); Kilmer v.
Carter, 2TI4 Cal.App.2d 81, 82, 87-88, 78
Cal.Rptr. 800 (1969); Pete v. Henderson,
124 Cal.App.2d 487, 491, 269 P.2d 78, 45
A.L.R.2d 58 (1954); Bryant v. Seagraves,
270 Or. 16, 18, 23, 526 P.2d 1027 (1974); 7
AmJur.2d t Attorneys at Law, § 172; 45
AJLIL2d 5, § 22.
[3] Plaintiff's complaint is that the distribution of the contracts ordered in the
divorce action constituted an abuse of judicial discretion. Plaintiff's counsel correctly
conceded at oral argument that the record
fails to reflect a probability of appellate
determination of abuse of discretion. Further, review of the record compels the conclusion that no possibility of an appellate
finding of abuse of discretion is shown.
Without unnecessarily extending this opinion by recitation of the particular facts,
suffice it to say the distribution of the
contracts proposed by plaintiff was an
equal distribution; the ordered distribution
was no less equal; and the ordered distribution is more favorable to plaintiff than his
ex-wife for the reason that plaintiff has
greater access to higher interest return during a rising money market while each
stands to lose equally during a falling money market
[4] We are mindful of the rules and
principles applicable to appellate review of
orders of summary judgment. They do not
need to be recited again. There is no material dispute as to the discussed controlling
issue. Summary judgment was proper.
Hiett v. Brier, 2 Kan.App.2d 610, 615, 586
P.2d 55, rev. denied 225 Kan. 844 (1978).
Affirmed.

4 Kan App 2d 57

George ALEXANDER, Appellant,
v.
STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
AND REHABILITATION SERVICES
OF KANSAS, Appellee.
No. 49979.
Court of Appeals of Kansas.
Nov. 16, 1979.

Appeal was taken from an order of the
Sumner District Court, Lloyd K. McDaniel,
J., denying plaintiffs motion to restore his
appeal from an adverse decision of the Appeals Committee of the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services. The Court
of Appeals, Swinehart, J., held that where
plaintiff had dismissed his attorney of record and notification of such dismissal had
been given to the court and all other parties
in the matter but no formal order of withdrawal had been entered, failure to serve
notice of further proceedings-in the-action
upon the attorney of record was not error
so long as the court ordered service upon
the party himself.
Judgment affirmed.

Attorney and Client <s=>76(l)
When a attorney of record has been
terminated by his client and notification of
such termination has been given to court
and all other parties in matter but no formal order of withdrawal has been entered,
failure to serve notice of further proceedings in the action upon attorney of record
was not error so long as court ordered service upon the party himself. Rules of Civil
Procedure, rule 5(b), K.S.A. 60-205(b).
Syllabus by the Court
When an attorney of record has been
terminated by his client and notification of
such termination has been given to the
court and all other parties in the matter but
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criminal conduct had been manifest, as in
Ocala Star-Banner Co. v Damron, 401 U.S
295, 91 S Ct. 628, 28 L Ed.2d 57 (1971) (false
publication that a candidate had been
charged with perjury in Federal Court) and
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 91
S.Ct. 621, 28 L.Ed.2d 35 (1971) (characterization of a candidate as "a former smalltime bootlegger"), the New York Times test
of actual malice (knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard of truth or falsity) would
be applicable.
Stone v. Essex
County
Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. at 863, 330
N.E.2d 161. Although we need not reach
the question of actual malice, we note with
approval that the trial judge, in the memorandum of his decision to grant defendants'
motions for judgment notwithstanding the
verdicts, ruled on the basis of the evidence
that the jury's finding of actual malice was
not warranted. National Assn. of Govt.
Employees, Inc. v. Central BdcsL Corp., 379
Mass. at
, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1979) at 2497,
396 N.R2d 996 (1979).
In view of our holding that the statements made by Gilgun and published by the
Woburn Daily Times were not defamatory
falsehoods, it is not necessary for us to
decide whether evidence of a statement allegedly made by the publisher of the Daily
Times to the plaintiff was properly excluded.
Judgments

for the defendants

affirmed.

of three counts of conspiracy to violate G L c.
30, § 39M (manner of awarding contracts for
construction and materials). The convictions
or any reference to them were not, however.

Roger C. GLIDDEN et al.1
v.
Domenic S. TERRANOVA.
Appeals Court of Massachusetts,
Essex.
Argued May 15, 1981.
Decided Nov. 13, 1981.
Clients appealed from a judgment of
the Superior Court, Doerfer, J., which
granted attorney's motion for directed verdict in malpractice action. The Appeals
Court, Essex County, Rose, J., held that
whether attorney-client relationship existed, whether attorney's conduct violated the
standard of reasonable care and diligence in
representing clients in outstanding legal action, and whether negligence of attorney in
failing to defend underlying litigation was
proximate cause of damages to clients, who
had default judgment entered against them
in the suit, were questions for jury.
Judgment reversed.
1. Attorney and Client &=> 129(2)
Expert testimony is generally necessary to establish standard care owed by
attorney in particular circumstances and a
defendant's alleged departure from it, because question whether attorney has exercised sufficient legal care is one of fact for
the jury; however, expert testimony is not
essential where the claimed legal malpractice is so gross or obvious that laymen
can rely on their common knowledge or
experience to recognize or infer negligence
from the facts.
2. Attorney and Client &=> 129(3)
Whether attorney-client relationship
existed or whether attorney's conduct violated the standard of reasonable care and
diligence in representing clients in outintroduced in evidence and therefore this question is not properly before us.
1. E\el\n M Glidden
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standing legal action was question for jury,
despite the fact that no expert testimony
was offered by clients.
3. Attorney and Client <s=> 129(2)
Where a party who was the plaintiff in
a legal action sues his attorney for negligence in the prosecution of that action, he
must establish that he probably would have
succeeded in the underlying litigation were
it not for the attorney's negligence.
4. Attorney and Client &=> 129(2)
Where attorney is sued by a client for
allegedly failing to defend that client's underlying litigation, the attorney should bear
the burden of proof that the client had no
defense.
5. Attorney and Client e=> 129(3)
Whether negligence of attorney in failing to defend underlying litigation was a
proximate cause of damages of clients, who
had default judgment entered against them
in the suit, was question for jury in subsequent malpractice action.

Bertram W. Allen, Manchester, for plaintiffs.
Stephen R. Duly, Andover, for defendant.
Before BROWN, ROSE and DREBEN,
ROSE, Justice.
The plaintiffs Glidden, husband and wife,
brought suit against the defendant Terranova, an attorney, alleging several claims in
tort and contract arising from the defendant's representation of them in a prior legal
proceeding. The plaintiffs had be$n sued in
District Court by a real estate broker seeking to recover a commission earned in the
sale of the plaintiffs' home. They now
contend that the defendant promised to
represent them and remove the action to
the Superior Court for a jury trial, and t h a t
the defendant's failure to do so resulted in
default judgments and, in subsequent supplementary proceedings, the arrest and imprisonment of Mr. Glidden fnr contempt in
not paying the judgment. At th~ :riat be-

low, the plaintiffs presented evidence to
support their claim, after which the defendant filed a motion for a .directed verdict.
The issues argued on appeal are whether
the Superior Court judge was justified in
allowing the motion for a directed verdict
on the grounds that (1) the plaintiff did not
offer expert testimony to establish either
an attorney-client relationship or that the
defendant violated the standard of care
owed by a lawyer to his client in these
particular circumstances, and (2) the plaintiffs' evidence could not support a conclusion t h a t the defendant's inaction was a
proximate cause of the damages alleged by
the plaintiffs. We hold that the evidence
was sufficient to require denial of the motion for a directed verdict and reverse the
judgment of the Superior Court.
f l j 1. An attorney owes his client an
obligation to exercise a reasonable degree
of care and skill in the performance of his
legal duties. Caverly v. McOwen, 123 Mass.
574 (1878). McLellan v. Fuller, 226 Mass.
374, 115 N.E. 481 (1917). Because the question whether an attorney has exercised sufficient legal care is one of fact for the jury
to decide, expert testimony is generally necessary to establish the standard of care
owed by an attorney in the particular circumstances and the defendant's alleged departure from it. Nolan, Tort Law § 186, a t
299 (1979). Barry, Legal Malpractice in
Massachusetts, 63 Mass.L.Rev. 15, 17 (1978).
However, expert testimony is not essential
where the claimed legal malpractice is so
gross or obvious that laymen can rely on
their common knowledge or experience to
recognize or infer negligence from the
facts. See Gilbert v. Williams, 8 Mass. 51,
57 (1811) ("whenever an attorney disobeys
the lawful instructions of his client, and a
loss ensues, for that loss the attorney is
responsible"); Varnum v. Martin, 15 Pick.
440 (1834) (evidence found sufficient to sustain a verdict against the attorney on the
ground of negligence despite the apparent
lack of expert testimony). The rule that
expert testimony is not always required to
prove leeal malpractice has been adopted in
other jurisdictions, see, e. g., bright v. vl'j/-
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lkin:< 47 Cal.App.3d S02. 121 Cal.Rptr. 1 ^
V1 *?** "0; CW,7n>* v. •'rrt-f.^yi(..-//?, oi h a w . z*>,

r v c u n v d -o d e w - m i n e w h e t h e r ;in ;i*t!oHH-yciiont reiat«on>mp existed or w h e t h e r t h e

595 P.2d 275 (1979); House v. MaJdo.v, 46
Ill.App.3d 68, 4 Ill.Dec. 644, 360 N.E.2d 580
(1977); Centra/ Cao Co. v. C/arA'e, 259 Md.
542, 2-70 A.2d 662 (1970); Hill v. Okay
Constr. Co., 312 Minn. 324, 252 N.W.2d 107
(1977); Olfe v. Gordon, 93 Wis.2d 173, 286
N.W.2d 573 (1980), and is consistent with
the approach followed in Massachusetts in
the medical malpractice context. See Polonsky v. Union Hosp.,
Mass.App.
,
, Mass.App.Ct.Adv.Sh. (1981) 675, 677,
418 N.E.2d 620 (1981), and cases cited
therein.
[2] The plaintiffs here testified that the
defendant agreed to represent them in an
outstanding legal action and that all legal
papers relative to that action were delivered to the defendant. According to their
testimony, the defendant promised to remove the action to the Superior Court for a
jury trial and later informed the plaintiffs
t h a t he had removed the action. The plaintiffs further testified that they did nothing
about the action in reliance on the defendant's representation that "everything is
well in hand" and that he would "straighten
the whole thing out." Actually, the defenda n t neither filed an answer nor removed the
action, a fact which came to the plaintiffs'
attention only after default judgments
were entered in the District Court. The
evidence indicates that the defendant was
notified in advance, yet failed to appear at
both the supplementary process hearing and
the contempt hearing which resulted in Mr.
Glidden's arrest and imprisonment. Finally, the plaintiffs testified that they telephoned the defendant after Mr. Glidden
was committed for contempt, at which time
they were told by a secretary that the defendant was in conference and could not be
disturbed. According to their testimony,
the sole response to the plaintiffs' request
for legal assistance was a subsequent telephone call from the defendant's secretary to
Mrs. Glidden suggesting that they "raise
bail" and seek other counsel. Viewed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiffs, DiMarzo v. S. & P. Realty Corp., 364 Mass.
510, 514, 306 N.E.2d 432 (1974), the evidence
was such t h a t expert testimony was not

defendant's conduct violated the standard
of reasonable care and diligence. Accordingly, it was error for the court to allow the
defendant's motion for a directed verdict on
the ground that no expert testimony was
offered.
[3-5] 2. Where a party who was the
plaintiff in a legal action sues his attorney
for negligence in the prosecution of that
action, he must establish that he probably
would have succeeded in the underlying litigation were it not for the attorney's negligence. McLeJlan v. Fuller, 226 Mass. at
378, 115 N.E. 481; Siano v. Martinelli,
Mass.App.
, Mass.App.Ct.Adv.Sh. (1981)
1678, 427 N.E.2d 489 (1981); Hurd v.
DiMcnto & Sullivan, 440 F.2d 1322, 1323
(1st Cir. 1971). However, there are no
cases in Massachusetts which answer the
question of where the burden of proof
lies in a malpractice action when the
defendant-attorney allegedly failed to defend in the underlying litigation. The
trial court in Salisbury v. Gourgas, 10
Met. 442 (1845), following the rule in
an early English case, Godefroy v. Jay,
7 Bing. 413, 131 Eng.Rep. 159 (1831),
imposed the burden on the attorney of
proving that the client had no defense, but
the propriety of this ruling was not addressed on appeal. We hold that the attorney should indeed bear the burden of proof
in such a case, for "since the client had no
obligation 4to prove his case' in the underlying action (he could have simply required
the plaintiff to prove his case), he should
not shoulder the burden of proving a defense in the malpractice action." Nolan,
Tort Law § 182 at 297. See Barry, Legal
Malpractice in Massachusetts, 63 Mass.L.
Rev. 15 at 17 n.31 ("to require the client to
prove that the underlying action was defensible requires him to establish in the malpractice suit that which he would not have
been required to prove in the underlying
action"). Because the plaintiffs in the
present case did not have the burden of
proving that they would have prevailed in
the underlying litigation if the defendant
had not been negligent, it was error for the
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Superior Court judge to allow the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the
ground that the plaintiffs did not prove the
defendant's negligence to be a proximate
cause of their damages.
Judgment

reversed.
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COMMONWEALTH
V.

Larry MIMS.
Appeals Court of Massachusetts,
Suffolk.
Argued Oct. 14, 1981.

3. Criminal Law <$=> 1169.11
Witness' response, on cross-examination by defense counsel, indicating that defendant had previously been an inmate did
not require new trial in view of the evidence presented and the circumstances surrounding the statement, which was not entirely unresponsive, though instruction to
disregard did not immediately follow the
unfortunate response.

Michael R. Pizziferri, Boston, for defendant.
Michael J. Traft, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the
Commonwealth.
Before ARMSTRONG, GREANEY and
PERRETTA, JJ.

Decided Nov. 16, 1981.
Further Appellate Review
Denied Jan. 6, 1982.
Defendant was convicted in Suffolk
County on indictments charging armed robbery and unlawful possession of a firearm
in an automobile, and he appealed. The
Appeals Court held that: (1) no substantial
risk of miscarriage of justice arose from
question asked of defense witness by trial
judge, and (2) new trial was not required by
^response of witness, on cross-examination
by defendant, indicating that defendant
had previously been an inmate.
Affirmed.

1. Criminal Law <s=>656(2)
Neither unexceptional and neutral
question asked of a defense witness by trial
judge nor response given, without objection,
gave rise to substantial risk of miscarriage
of justice, especially in view of final instructions that jury were to attach no special significance to any question judge may
have aoked of witnesses.
2. Criminal Law <3=>1I58(4)
Trial judge's findings of fact made on
rnot'on tn sunoress. supported bv the evi-

RESCRIPT.
The defendant appeals from convictions
on indictments charging him with armed
robbery, G.L. c. 265, § 17, and unlawful
possession of a firearm in an automobile,
G.L. c. 269, § 10(a), as amended through
St.1975, c. 113, § 2.
1. There is no necessity for us either to
approve or disapprove the practice of allowing jurors to submit questions to the judge
to be put to a witness, as the question here
in issue wras so insignificant and lacking in
substance as to be innocuous. But see People v. Heard, 388 Mich. 182, 186-188, 200
N.W.2d 73 (1972); State v. Taylor, 25 Ariz.
App. 497, 499-500, 544 P.2d 714 (1976);
Cheeks v. State, 266 Ind. 190, 195-196, 361
N.E.2d 906 (1977). Compare State v. Anderson, 108 Utah 130, 133-134, 158 P.2d 127
(1945); State v. Sheppard, 100 Ohio App.
345, 390, 128 N.E.2d 471 (1955); Stinson v.
State, 151 Ga.App. 533, 536-537, 260 S.E.2d
407 (1979).
[1] 2. The defendant made no objection when the judge asked a defense witness an unexceptional and neutral question.
See Commonwealth v. Festa, 369 Mass. 419,
423. 341 N.E.2d 276 (1976V Neither the
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rate it charges its other municipal custom- unenforceable as beyond scope of county's
ers for wheeling power.
power to construct sewage disposal systems.
16. The court does not find it necessary
Motion granted.
at this time to require the cities 10 furnish a
bond. The court is satisfied that the cities
are able to respond in damages if KG & E 1. Attorney and Client <$=> 129(2)
To recover against an attorney for negdoes suffer damages by reason of the injunction. See Continental Oil Co. v. Fron- ligence, a plaintiff must prove the attortier Refining Co., 338 F.2d 780, 782-83 (10th ney's employment, his neglect of a reasonable duty and that such negligence resulted
Cir.1964).
in
and was proximate cause of plaintiff's
This memorandum is the basis for the
loss.
order entered on May 27, 1983, in which the
court granted plaintiffs' motion for prelimi- 2. Counties <s=> 124(1)
nary injunction, and ordered KG & E to
Municipal Corporations <2=^247
wheel the cities their current entitlements
Virginia counties and cities cannot be
to power generated by the Southwestern bound by a contract which is beyond the
Power Administration and Nearman Creek
scope of their powers and such ultra vires
at the prevailing rate it charges other mucontracts are void ab initio.
nicipalities for its wheeling services, such
rate being subject to approval by the Feder- 3. Municipal Corporations o=>724
al Energy Regulatory Commission. The orAlthough a Virginia municipal corporader further provides that it is unnecessary tion acts in a proprietary capacity when it
at this time for the cities to furnish a bond. operates or maintains a sewer, it acts in a
governmental capacity and exercises discretionary functions when selecting and adopting a plan for construction of a sewage
disposal system. Va.Code 1950, § 15.1-320.

Dallas BYRD, Plaintiff,
v.
MARTIN, HOPKINS, LEMON AND
CARTER, P.C., et al., Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 81-0559-R.
United States District Court,
W.D. Virginia,
Roanoke Division.
June 1, 1983.
Action was brought for legal malpractice. Defendants moved for summary
judgment. The District Court, Turk, Chief
Judge, held that under Virginia law, purported contract between county and builder
of proposed shopping center to provide the
complex with sewer service was ultra vires
and void ab initio insofar as it purported to
restrict discretionary authority to promote
public health and that even if the contract
did not restrict discretionary power it was

4. Municipal Corporations <$=>62, 247
Units of Virginia local government
cannot by contract or otherwise barter
away or surrender their essential legislative
or police powers and contracts which impinge on those essential governmental powers are void.
5. Counties <s=>124(l)
Although a Virginia county has power
to construct sewer systems, if it enters into
a contract which restricts exercise of that
discretionary legislative function, such contract is ultra vires and void ab initio. Va.
Code 1950, § 15.1-320.
6. Counties e=>124(l)
Under Virginia law, purported contract
between county and builder of proposed
shopping center to provide sewer services
was ultra vires and void ab initio insofar as
it purported to restrict discretionary authority to promote public health and was
also ultra vires as an attempt to obligate
county to construct the sewer system even
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if the project was not approved by the
State Water Control Board, as required by
statute, or if county could not obtain voter
approval to issue bonds and even if contract
did not restrict discretionary power it was
unenforceable as beyond scope of county's
power to construct sewage disposal systems.
Va.Code 1950, §§ 15.1-320, 15.1-322 to 15.1-324.
7. Attorney and Client e=> 129(4)
Alleged negligence of counsel in bringing breach of contract action, which was
dismissed
apparently
on
limitations
grounds, could not have been proximate
cause of client's failure to recover damages
for county's alleged breach of contract to
construct sewer system to serve client's
shopping center where, under state law, any
such contract would be ultra vires and void
ab initio.
Fergus B. Norton, Roanoke, Va., for
plaintiff.
George W. Wooten, Wm. B. Poff, Woods,
Rogers, Muse, Walker & Thornton, Roanoke, Va., for defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
TURK, Chief Judge.
Dallas Byrd (Byrd) brought this action
for legal malpractice against Martin, Hopkins, Lemon and Carter, P.C., (MHL & C),
William L. Martin, Osterhoudt, Ferguson,
Natt and Aheron, P.C, (OFN & A), Charles
H. Osterhoudt, Michael S. Ferguson, Edward A. Natt and Michael J. Aheron. Jurisdiction vests in this court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). This action is now before the court on the defendants' motions
for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P.
56.
Byrd's legal malpractice action arises out
of the following facts. In 1972, Byrd
owned land in Botetourt County, Virginia,
on which he wished to construct a shopping
center. In M^.rch 1972, he ro^v«*w.i bis
intention to build a shopping center t<> the
Botetourt County Board of Supervisors
(Board;.
Specifically, by letter dated

ter. . . . Before leasing commitments can
be made and actual construction begun it is
imperative that this area "be served with
public sewer service. Therefore, I request
you to consider serving this area with a
public sewer system in the immediate future." (Byrd Dep.Ex. 3). The Board responded by passing a resolution on March
24, 1972, which stated that "this Board does
hereby pledge its efforts and resources to
provide this complex and the surrounding
area with sewer service which service is
further pledged to be available at the time
of opening of the center." (Byrd Dep.Ex.
Byrd next appeared before the Board on
February 19, 1973, at which time he informed the Board that he was ready to
begin constructing the shopping center but
that he first needed reassurance from the
Board that sewer service would be available
to the project by March 1974. At that time,
the Board reaffirmed its commitment of
1972 to provide sewer service to the shopping center by March 1974. Byrd was notified of the Board's decision by a letter
dated February 22, 1973. (Byrd Supp.
Dep.Ex. 13 and 13A). Byrd contends that
the March 14, 1972 letter to the Board, and
the Board's February 22, 1973 letter to him
constituted a written contract obligating
him to build a shopping center in return for
Botetourt County providing sewer service
to the site of the proposed shopping center.
Botetourt County subsequently began exploring various alternatives for providing
sewer service to the area of the proposed
shopping center. However, no sewer system was ever provided to the area, and
Byrd did not start construction of the proposed shopping center. Byrd eventually defaulted on payments to a bank on various
loans, and the bank sold the property in
Botetourt County at public auction on July
28, 1978.
Byrd ih-n retained MHL & C to sue the
county inv breach *>;' contract. On February 28, 1979, MHL & C filed suit against
the county in state court. But a nonsuit
-.v.--
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547 and -550. The Board disallowed Byrd's
claim on December 17, 1979.
Due to a conflict of interest, MHL & C
subsequently referred Byrd to OFN £ A,
whom Byrd contacted in January 19S0 concerning his claim against the county. On
March 7, 1980, OFN & A filed suit against
the county for breach of contract. However, on August 15, 1980, this action was
also nonsuited. Byrd then filed another
claim with the Board on September 3, 1980.
And on October 15, 1980, OFN & A filed a
second lawsuit against the county for
breach of contract. That action was dismissed by the state court on October 1,
198L Byrd filed this action on December
28, 1981, alleging that these defendants
were negligent in handling his breach of
contract claim against the county.
On March 1, 1983, the OFN & A defendants filed a motion for summary judgment
on the grounds that their alleged negligence could not have been the proximate
cause of Byrd's damages in that the applicable limitations period had expired on his
breach of contract claim prior to his retention of these defendants as his counsel. On
March 30, 1983, the MHL & C defendants
filed a motion for summary judgment on
the grounds that (1) the limitations period
for Byrd's legal malpractice claim had expired; (2) the limitations period for Byrd's
breach of contract claim had expired prior
to his retention of these defendants; and
(3) these defendants' alleged negligence was
not the proximate cause of Byrd's damages
because the negligence of OFN & A was
the superseding intervening cause of his
alleged injury.
These motions came on for a hearing on
April 6, 1983, and the court took them under advisement pending the submission of a
brief in opposition by Byrd's counsel.
Thereafter, on May 20, 1983, the MHL &
C defendants filed a supplemental motion
for summary judgment on the grounds that
their alleged negligence was not the proximate cause of Byrd's injury in that (1) there
was never any contract between the Board
and Byrd because there was no meeting of
the minds or mutuality of obligation, and
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Tract w;b ultra vires and ihus unenforceable against the Board.
On May 25, 1983, BynYs counsel filed a
;>r:ef in oppuMl;on to MIIL ^ (. s lirst motion for summary judgment. On that same
date, the court held a telephone conference
call during which the parties gave argument in support of their respective positions, and the OFN & A defendants joined
in MHL & C's supplemental motion for
summary judgment. The court having considered the argument of counsel and the
entire record, defendants' motions for summary judgment are now ready for disposition.
A motion for summary judgment should
be granted only if there is no genuine issue
of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The appropriate focus
in this diversity action, of course, is whether
the undisputed facts show that the defendants are entitled to judgment under the law
of Virginia. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, DS S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188
(1937).
[1] To recover against an attorney for
negligence, a plaintiff must prove (1) the
attorney's employment; (2) his neglect of a
reasonable duty; and (3) that such negligence resulted in and was the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's loss. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Price, 231 F. 397, 401 (4th
Cir.1916). Proof that the attorney was negligent is itself insufficient. *'[T]he extent
of the damages sustained by the complainant must be affirmatively shown; for the
attorney is only liable for the actual injury
his client has received. . . . " Allied Productions, Inc. v. Duesterdick, 217 Va. 763, 764,
232 S.E.2d 774, 775 (1977).
Byrd alleges that the defendants negligently handled his breach of contract claim
against Botetourt County and that OFN &
A was negligent in failing to sue MHL & C
for the latter's negligence in suing the
county. Therefore, to recover against the
defendants for negligence. Byrd must prove
that they were negligent and that but for
their negligence, he would have recovered
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damages against Botetourt County for
breach of contract. And if the undisputed
facts reveal that any of these elements of
proof are absent, the defendants will be
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The parties are in sharp dispute as to
whether there was ever any contract
formed between Byrd and the Board. The
defendants argue that there was no meeting of the minds and that the essential
terms of the alleged contract were so uncertain that they created no power of acceptance in the Board. The defendants further
argue that the alleged contract lacked mutuality of obligation because Byrd never
promised to do anything in return for the
county providing sewer service to his land.
Byrd contends, however, that the letters
exchanged between him and the Board both
before and after February 19, 1973, constituted a "meeting of the minds," and that
many of the absent terms were unforeseeable at that time. And Byrd testified that
he promised to build a shopping center in
exchange for the county providing his land
with sewer service. (Bvrd Supp.Dep. 39-40,
81).
Regardless of whether summary judgment is appropriate on the basis that there
was no contract, see Charbonnages De
France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406 (4th Cir.
1979), assuming without deciding that a
contract was formed between Byrd and the
Board, the court concludes that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment because their alleged negligence, as a matter
of law, could not have proximately caused
Byrd's alleged injury.
[2] Counties and cities cannot be bound
by a contract which is beyond the scope of
their powers. Richard L. Deal and Associates, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 224 Va.
,
299 S.E.2d 346 (1983). And such ultra vires
contracts are void ab initio, thereby allowing a local governmental unit to set up as a
defense its lack of power. Id.
[31 Station 15.1--320 "f tho Co#!e of Virginia provides in part that "[f]or the purpose of providing relief from pollution and
for the improvement of conditions affecting

To establish, construct . . . operate and
maintain a sewage disposal system . . . ,
subject to the approval of the State Water
Control Board." Although a municipal corporation acts in a proprietary capacity when
it operates or maintains a sewer, it acts in a
governmental capacity and exercises discretionary functions when selecting and adopting a plan for the construction of a sewage
disposal system. Cf. Freeman v. City of
Norfolk, 221 Va. 57, 266 S.E.2d 885 (1980)
(street maintenance is proprietary function
but street design is governmental function).
Byrd alleges that the Board promised to
provide a sewage system to his proposed
shopping center. The Board's determination of whether to build a sewer system was
a governmental function which was subject
to the Board's discretion. Consequently,
the contract between Byrd and the Board
concerned a governmental function and the
exercise of legislative discretion.
[4,5] The Supreme Court of Virginia
has indicated that units of local government
cannot by contract or otherwise barter
away or surrender their essential legislative
or police powers, and that contracts which
impinge upon these essential governmental
powers are void. See Mumpower v. Housing Authority of City of Bristol, 176 Va.
426, 452, 11 SE.2d 732, 742-43 (1940) (holding inter alia that a provision in a contract
whereby a city agreed to vacate and close
streets selected for such by a housing authority was invalid because the location of
public ways was a legislative function, and
the contract provision thus infringed upon
the city's legislative and discretionary powers); cf. Va.Code § 15.1-19.5 (1981 Repl.
Vol.) (officers of a local governmental unit
may delegate powers and duties unless such
requires the exercise of judgment for the
public welfare). Thus, although a county
has the power to construct sewer systems, if
it enters into a contract which restricts the
exercise of this discretionary legislative
Uip.i'Lion, such contract is ultra vires and
void ab initio.
As indicated above, the subject of the
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tiv.;- discretion. So the court *rust determine whether this contract restricted the
£>oaios legislative p-owers ami was thus
void.
The court concludes that the contract
purported to restrict the statutory authority granted the Board by Va.Code § 15.1—
320 to determine whether it was in the
public interest to construct a sewage disposal system in the area of the proposed shopping center. According to Byrd. the Board
promised in the contract to "have the [sewer] service available by your contemplated
opening date of March 1974." (Byrd
Dep.Ex. 13). This contract thus hampered
the discretion of future boards to determine
if the public interest would best be served
by constructing a sewer in that area.
Moreover, the express terms of this contract imposed an unconditional obligation
upon Botetourt County to build a sewer
system, regardless of whether the county
could obtain suitable financial arrangements. This absence of a condition that
suitable financing be obtained further restricted the Board's legislative discretion.
See Mumpower, 176 Va. at 45, 11 S.E.2d at
743.
[6] The court therefore holds that the
alleged contract to provide sewer services to
Byrd's land purported to restrict the
Board's discretionary authority to promote
the public health. Thus, assuming that the
contract was formed, it was ultra vires and
void ab initio, and the Board would have
been able to successfully plead its own lack
of power in Byrd's breach of contract action. Accord Rockingham Square Shopping
Center, Inc. v. Town of Madison, 45 N.C.
App. 249, 262 S.E.2d 705 (1980) (contract
wherein a town promised to open road as
inducement for corporation to build shopping center was ultra vires and unenforceable against the town because it restricted
the discretionary authority of the town's
governing body).
The contract was also ultra vires and thus
void ah initio in that it attempted to obligate the Board to construct a sewer system
even if the project was not approved by the
State Water Control Board, see Va.Code
§ 15.1-320 (1981 Repl.Vol). or the county

could no: obtain voter anproval to finance
the project i»y the issuance of bonds. See
Ya.Cooe ^>$ i5.i—322 —»>24 (i'^bl KepiA ol.).
Thus, even if the contract did not restrict
the Board's discretionary power, it was still
unenforceable because it went beyond the
scope of the county's power to construct
sewage disposal systems. See Richard L.
Deal and Associates, Inc., supra.
[7] In light of these conclusions, the
court holds that the defendants' alleged
negligence could not have been the proximate cause of Byrd's failure to recover
damages for the Board's alleged breach of
contract. Accordingly, the defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on Byrd's
legal malpractice claims. This decision renders unnecessary a determination of the
parties' other contentions. An appropriate
order and judgment will be entered this
dav.

Carolyn F. FERGUSON, Plaintiff,
v.
AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH COMPANY, Defendant.
No. 82-0327-CV-W-l.
United States District Court,
W.D. Missouri, W.D.
June 2, 1983.
In a suit under the equal employment
opportunity provisions of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and under the 1871 civil rights
statute, the District Court, John W. Oliver,
Senior District Judge, after trial by the
court, held that, under evidence, there was
no racial discrimination playing any part in
denial of promotions or in suspension or
ultimate termination of the plaintiff's employment, but, rather, the sole reason for
her denial of promotions, her suspension
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speedy trial were denied. Defendant was
thereafter convicted of assault in the
second degree and this appeal ensued.

58 A.D.2d 683
Joseph GARGUILO, Appellant,

[1] Defendant raises several contentions
on this appeal. Initially defendant contends that he was denied a speedy trial. A
review of the record reveals that the District Attorney was at all times ready to
proceed to trial, and that the delay of defendant's trial was caused by his own actions and conduct. Consideration of the
record in its entirety while weighing the
relevant factors as outlined by the Court of
Appeals in People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d
442, 373 N.Y.S.2d 79, 335 N.E.2d 303 leads
this court to the conclusion that defendant
was not denied his constitutional right to a
speedy trial.

Philip SCHUNK, Defendant and ThirdParty Plaintiff-Respondent,

[2] Defendant also contends that his
second trial should not have been held in
that it placed him in double jeopardy. We
disagree. His statements to the court prior
to declaration of the mistrial clearly indicated his unwillingness to proceed. Although he did not specifically move for a
mistrial, defendant's statements can only be
looked upon as a request for such relief and
no objection was made by defendant when
the mistrial was declared. Consequently,
we are of the view that the defense of
double jeopardy is unavailing (Matter of
Napoli v. Supreme Court of State of N. Y.,
40 A.D.2d 159, 338 N.Y.S.2d 721, affd., 33
N.Y.2d 980, 353 N.Y.S.2d 740, 309 N.E.2d
137, cert, den., 417 U.S. 947, 94 S.Ct. 3073,
41 L.Ed.2d 668).
We have carefully considered defendant's
remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. Defendant's conviction, therefore,
should not be disturbed.
Judgment affirmed.
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Solomon Abrahams, Third-Party
Defendant
Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
Third Department.
June 9, 1977.
Appeal was taken from an order of the
Supreme Court, Albany County, which
granted a motion to dismiss a legal malpractice complaint. The Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, held that the complaint
was properly dismissed for the plaintiff's
failure to make a showing that a meritorious defense had been available to him in the
underlying litigation which gave rise to the
malpractice charge.
Affirmed.
1. Attorney and Client <s=> 129(2)
In an action for legal malpractice arising out of attorney's alleged negligent failure to answer or respond to complaint
against client, client must show not only
that the attorney was negligent but also
that client would have been successful in
the underlying action but for the attorney's
negligence.
2. Attorney and Client «=» 129(3)
Legal malpractice complaint which was
based on allegation that attorney had been
negligent in neither answering nor otherwise responding to complaint against client
was properly dismissed where client failed
to meet his burden of proving that a meritorious defense had been available to him in
the underlying action.
Solomon Abrahams, White Plains, for appellant.
Hart & Hume, New York City (Duncan
B. Hume, New York City, of counsel), for
respondent.
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Before KOREMAN, P. J., and GREENBLOTT, SWEENEY, MAIN and LARKIN,
JJ.
MEMORANDUM DECISION.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme
Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered July
28, 1976 in Albany County, which granted a
motion by defendant at the close of the
plaintiff's case to dismiss the complaint by
reason of the failure of the plaintiff to
make out a prima facie case.
This action arises out of the alleged malpractice of the defendant, an attorney who
was retained by the plaintiff, to defend an
action brought against the plaintiff by Robert Kirkpatrick individually and on behalf
of Ulster Erectors, Inc. On May 29, 1973 a
default judgment was entered by Kirkpatrick against the plaintiff. In July, 1973
the third-party defendant herein and the
present counsel of the plaintiff made a motion to open the default judgment. That
motion was "denied without prejudice to
renew upon production of more specific evidence that defendant has a meritorious defense". Ten months later when another
motion was made to vacate the default
judgment, the motion was again denied on
the ground that the plaintiff did not
present a sufficient affidavit of merit.
This action followed.
It was found and is not disputed that
defendant was negligent in neither answering nor otherwise responding to the complaint against plaintiff in the Kirkpatrick
action.
[1,2] The trial court dismissed the action on the ground that the plaintiff failed
to make a showing that a meritorious defense was available in the underlying Kirkpa tridc action. The decision of the trial
court should be affirmed. It is settled law
in New York that in an action against an
attorney for alleged malpractice, the plaintiff must show not only that the defendant
was negligent, but also that the plaintiff
would have been successful in the underlying action. This court recently reaffirmed
this principle in Carpenter v. Weichert, 51
A.D.2d 817, at page 818, 379 N.Y.S.2d 191,
at page 193, where it said:

In order for plaintiff to recover in this
malpractice action, he must prove facts
which would enable the jury to find that
he would have recovered against [the
defendant in the underlying action] but
for his attorney's negligence (Gladden v.
Logan> 28 A.D.2d 1116, 284 N.Y.S.2d
920).
Since the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof and failed to prove a prima
facie case, the dismissal of the complaint
was proper.
Order affirmed, without costs.
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58 A.D.2d 672

The PEOPLE of the State of New
York, Respondent,
v.
Andrew Dale BLIM, Appellant
Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
Third Department.
June 9, 1977.

Defendant was convicted in the County
Court, Chemung County, of burglary in the
third degree and petit larceny and was sentenced to concurrent terms of three and
one-half to seven years' imprisonment and
one-year imprisonment. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that (1) defendant was not entitled to a second hearing on the voluntariness of his confession, absent allegation
that any new facts came to light after the
first hearing which were not previously
within the knowledge of the defendant; (2)
defendant could be cross-examined regarding prior burglaries committed by him, and
(3) the sentence was not excessive.
Affirmed.

